Knowledge that Transforms

In a dynamic principal-agent model, the principal, financing the project, cannot observe project failure and the agent, developing the project, can hide failure. As there is a tension between incentives for disclosure of failure and project development, the optimal contract does not reward failure and incentivize disclosure of failure during an initial unconditional financing stage. During the subsequent disclosure stage, time-decreasing rewards for failure provide incentives for disclosure of failure. The continuation of financing becomes more performance-sensitive across stages, and the agent’s incentives are backloaded. The model explains several empirical patterns in venture capital financing and the financing of innovation.

Frazzini and Pedersen’s (2014) Betting Against Beta (BAB) factor is based on the same basic idea as Blacks’(1972) beta-arbitrage, but its astonishing performance has generated academic interest and made it highly influential with practitioners. This performance is driven by non-standard procedures used in its construction that effectively, but non-transparently, equal weight stock returns. For each dollar invested in BAB, the strategy commits on average $1.05 to stocks in the bottom 1% of total market capitalization. BAB earns positive returns after accounting for transaction costs, but earns these by tilting toward profitability and investment. Predictable biases resulting from Frazzini and Pedersen’s non-standard beta estimation procedure drive results presented as evidence supporting BAB’s underlying theory.

We create a novel dataset to examine the recent rise in dual-class IPOs. We document that dual-class firms have different types of controlling shareholders and wedges between voting and economic rights, and that the increasing popularity of dual-class structures is driven by founder-controlled firms. We find that founders’ wedge is greater when founders have stronger bargaining power. The increase in founder control over time is due to greater availability of private capital and technological shocks that reduced firms’ needs for external financing. Stronger bargaining power is also associated with a lower likelihood of sunset provisions that terminate dual-class structures.

We study the determinants of asset market fragmentation in a model with strategic investors that disagree about the value of an asset. Investors’ choices determine the market structure. Fragmented markets are supported in equilibrium when disagreement between investors is low. In this case, investors take the same side of the market and are willing to trade in smaller markets with a higher price impact to face less competition when trading against a dealer. The maximum degree of market fragmentation increases as investors’ priors are more correlated. Dealers can benefit from fragmentation, but investors are always better off in centralized markets.

We develop a theory of how corporate lending and financial intermediation change based on the fundamentals of the firm and its environment. We focus on the interaction between the prospective net worth or liquidity of an industry and the firm’s internal governance or pledgeability. Variations in prospective liquidity can induce changes in the nature, covenants, and quantity of loans that are made, the identity of the lender, and the extent to which the lender is leveraged. We offer predictions on how these might vary over the financial cycle.

I study the effects of an increase in the supply of local mortgage credit on house prices by exploiting a natural experiment from Switzerland. In 2008, retail customers migrate deposits from universal banks that are suffering overseas losses to homogeneous and narrowly-local mortgage banks. Using the distance between the two types of banks as an instrument for deposit growth, I show that local mortgage banks increase mortgage lending, which correlates with subsequent house price growth in their markets. My results highlight that bank specialization plays an important role in the allocation of capital.

Across a broad range of equipment types and industries, we document a pattern of local capital reallocation from older firms to younger firms. Start-ups purchase a disproportionate share of old physical capital previously owned by more mature firms. The evidence is consistent with financial constraints driving differential demand for vintage capital. The local supply of used capital influences start-up entry, job creation, investment choices, and growth, particularly when capital is immobile. Meanwhile, as suppliers of used capital, incumbents accelerate capital replacement in the presence of younger firms. The evidence suggests previously undocumented benefits to co-location between old and young firms.

We study bank regulation under optimal contracting, absent exogenous distortions. In equilibrium, banks offer a senior claim (deposits) to external investors and retain equity; the return on equity is higher than the return on deposits due to a scarcity of skilled bankers. Inefficient equilibria emerge under asymmetric information. Optimally designed regulation restores efficiency. Our main result is that disclosure requirements by themselves can be endogenously costly because they may push the economy from a separating equilibrium to a less efficient equilibrium that pools good and bad banks, but always improve welfare when combined with capital regulation.

Classical security design papers equate competitive capital markets to securities being fairly priced in expectation. We revisit Nachman and Noe’s (1994) adverse selection setting, modeling capital market competition as free entry of investors and allowing firms to propose prices for their securities, as happens in private securities placements and bank lending. We identify equilibria in which high types issue underpriced debt, which yields positive expected profits to uninformed lenders, while low types issue steeper securities, such as equity. In addition, pooling equilibria exist in which all firms issue underpriced debt. Introducing pre-existing capital structures provides further foundations for pecking-order theories of external finance.

The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique setting in which to evaluate the importance of a country’s fiscal capacity in explaining the relation between economic growth shocks and sovereign default risk. For a sample of 30 developed countries, we find a positive and significant sensitivity of sovereign default risk to the intensity of the virus’s spread for fiscally constrained governments. Supporting the fiscal channel, we confirm the results for Eurozone countries and U.S. states, for which monetary policy can be held constant. Our analysis suggests that financial markets penalize sovereigns with low fiscal space, impairing their resilience to external shocks.