This paper examines irreversible investment decisions when projects take time to complete and are subject to two types of cost uncertainty. The first is technical uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the physical difficulty of completing a project, which is only resolved as the investment proceeds. The second is input cost uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the prices of construction inputs or over government regulations affecting construction costs, which is external to the firm. These two types of uncertainty have very different effects on the investment decision. A simple investment rule is derived that maximizes firm value, and is used to analyze the decision to start or continue building a nuclear power plant during the 1980s.

This paper investigates whether portfolio return autocorrelation can be explained by time-varying expected returns, nontrading, state limit orders, market maker inventory policy, or transaction costs. Evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that transaction costs cause portfolio autocorrelation by slowing price adjustment. I develop a transaction-cost model which predicts that prices adjust faster when changes in valuation are large in relation to the bid-ask spread. Cross-sectional tests support this prediction, but time-series tests do not.

Dual-class exchange offers give stockholders the oppurtunity to exchange common stock for shares with limited voting rights but higher dividends. This paper develops a model to analyze the exchange decision. It shows that exchange offers can induce outside shareholders to exchange their shares for limited voting shares even though the same shareholders, in the same circumstances but acting collectively, would choose not to exchange.

This paper uses arbitrage arguments to calculate the market value of riskless after-tax cash flows. The market value equals the present value of riskless after-tax cash flows discounted at the after-corporate-tax riskless interest rate. The market value equals the adjusted present value of riskless after-tax cash flows only when the incremental debt used in the adjusted present value calculations equals the market value of the remaining after-tax cash flows. Also, the analysis provides valuation formulas when interest and tax rates are certain but not uniform and when interest rates are uncertain.

Several studies of mergers and tender offers examine the changes in the value of ownership claims associated with corporate acquisitions and use the observed value changes to address the degree of competition in the market for corporate acquisitions. These studies conclude that the takeover market is competitive on the basis of the abnormal stock price changes of bidding firms, the time series behavior of the market value of target firms, and the proportion of gains that accrue to target and bidding firms. Unfortunately, none of these tests are sufficient to conclude that the takeover market is competitive. A competitive acquisition market implies that the potential gain to unsuccessful bidders at the successful offer price is nonpositive. This implication is tested using data on tender offers in which there are multiple bidders. The results appear to be consistent with competition in the market for corporate acquisitions.

The macro literature presents conflicting evidence on the effects of price controls. In this study, the fact that the macro-economic effect of wage and price controls is the aggregation of the micro-economic effects is used to implement a different approach to measure the effects of price controls. The effect of price controls is inferred from examining the impact of discretionary regulatory decisions on the equity values of individual firms during Phase II of Nixon's Economic Stabilization Program. The empirical results indicate that violators of the regulations incurred significant abnormal losses that were unrelated to the explicit penalties. This suggests that implicit penalties were imposed on offending firms. The analysis of price increase decisions provides weak evidence that these Price Commission decisions had an impact on equity values.

This paper examines the ‘accuracy’ of information and its effect on social welfare. Information is defined to be more accurate than the existing information if individuals are willing to revise their subjective, homogeneous beliefs based on the new information. In a pure exchange economy where individuals may differ in endowments and tastes, it is shown that, for all utility functions satisfying risk aversion and non-satiation, the receipt of more accurate information does not increase social welfare (in terms of ex-ante Pareto-optimality) even when such information production is costless. This represents a more rigorous analysis on several issues that are not clear in the Marshall (1974) paper. Using the HARA class of utility functions, this paper also addresses the relationship between information and borrowing and lending, and the effect of information on the risk-free rate of interest.

This paper examines stock market efficiency with respect to money supply data by testing (1) regression models of stock returns on monetary variables and (2) trading rules based on money supply data. The evidence indicates no meaningful lag in the effect of monetary policy on the stock market and that no profitable security trading rules using past values of the money supply exist. Therefore this evidence is consistent with the efficient market model. Current security returns incorporate all information contained in past money supply data and, in addition, appear to anticipate future changes in the money supply. A number of previous studies have concluded that lags exist and can be used in profitable trading rules. Analysis of these studies demonstrates that for a variety of reasons the evidence in these past studies does not sustain such conclusions.

We test for fire-sale tendencies in automatic bankruptcy auctions. We find evidence consistent with fire-sale discounts when the auction leads to piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern. Neither industry-wide distress nor the industry affiliation of the buyer affect prices in going-concern sales. Bids are often structured as leveraged buyouts, which relaxes liquidity constraints and reduces bidder underinvestment incentives in the presence of debt overhang. Prices in “prepack” auctions (sales agreements negotiated prior to bankruptcy filing) are on average lower than for in-auction going-concern sales, suggesting that prepacks may help preempt excessive liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. Prepack targets have a greater industry-adjusted probability of refiling for bankruptcy, indicating that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.