Knowledge that Transforms

It seems plausible that an increase in stock market volatility raises required stock returns, and thus lowers stock prices. We develop a formal model of this volatility feedback effect using a simple model of changing variance (a quadratic generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic, or QGARCH, model). Our model is asymmetric and helps to explain the negative skewness and excess kurtosis of U.S. monthly and daily stock returns over the period 1926–1988. We find that volatility feedback normally has little effect on returns, but it can be important during periods of high volatility.

The role of fee contracts in the agency relation between investment bankers and client firms in tender offers is investigated using a sample of offers between 1978 and 1986. Different fees have different payoff functions which can be used by firms to create incentives and by bankers to signal differences in abilities. The effectiveness of fee contracts in resolving agency problems in tested, with mixed results. The evidence suggests that fee contracts are used as a tool by both firms and bankers and that contracts influence tender offer outcomes but that contracting is only a partial solution to the agency problem.

We show the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross term structure framework can allow a variety of alternative equilibrium solutions for discount bond prices. This is important since it allows us additional flexibility in developing models that capture the properties of the term structure. As an example, we solve for the value of a discount bond when the short-term rate is absorbed at zero. We compare the yields implied by this model to those implied by the original Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross model. We also show that alternative equilibria can occur in other term structure models.

This paper investigates the effect of bankruptcy announcements on the equity value of the bankrupt firm's competitors. On average, bankruptcy announcements decrease the value of a value-weighted portfolio of competitors by 1%. This negative effect is significantly larger for highly levered industries and industries where the unconditional stock returns of the nonbankrupt and bankrupt firms are highly correlated; the effect is significantly positive for highly concentrated industries with low leverage, suggesting that in such industries competitors benefit from the difficulties of the bankrupt firm.

We estimate the conditional distribution of trade-to-trade price changes using ordered probit, a statistical model for discrete random variables. This approach recognizes that transaction price changes occur in discrete increments, typically eighths of a dollar, and occur at irregularly-spaced time intervals. Unlike existing models of discrete transactions prices, ordered probit can quantify the effects of other economic variables like volume, past price changes, and the time between trades on price changes. Using 1988 transactions data for over 100 randomly chosen U.S. stocks, we estimate the ordered probit model via maximum likelihood and use the parameter estimates to measure several transaction-related quantities, such as the price impact of trades of a given size, the tendency towards price reversals from one transaction to the next, and the empirical significance of price discreteness.

This paper argues that corporations may use convertible bonds as an indirect way to get equity into their capital structures when adverse-selection problems make a conventional stock issue unattractive. Unlike other theories of convertible bond issuance, the model here highlights: 1) the importance of call provisions on convertibles and 2) the significance of costs of financial distress to the information content of a convertible issue.

We examine explanations for corporate financing-, dividend-, and compensation-policy choices. We document robust empirical relations among corporate policy decisions and various firm characteristics. Our evidence suggests contracting theories are more important in explaining cross-sectional variation in observed financial, dividend, and compensation policies than either tax-based or signaling theories.

Exchange members claim that the professional relationships that evolve on exchange floors yield benefits not easily duplicated by an anonymous exchange mechanism. We show that longstanding relationships between brokers and specialists can mitigate the effects of asymmetric information. Moreover, a specialist who actively attempts to differentiate between informed and uninformed traders can achieve equilibria that Pareto-dominate an equilibrium in which the two types of trades are pooled. Our model also elucidates the role of block trading houses in mitigating information problems in the block market.

This paper examines the post-acquisition performance of large bank mergers between 1982 and 1987. On the whole, the merged banks outperform the banking industry. Their better performance appears to result from improvements in the ability to attract loans and deposits, in employee productivity, and in profitable asset growth. Further, we find a significant correlation between announcement-period abnormal stock returns and the various performance measures, showing that market participants are able to identify in advance the improved performance associated with bank acquisitions.

Average common stock price responses to convertible preferred stock calls are significantly negative only when firms employ underwriters to assure conversion. Previous work reports similar results for convertible bond calls; we find that the stock price reaction does not depend upon the type of convertible security being called. The results support the idea that managers are more likely to have calls underwritten the more unfavorable their private information about firm value.