Knowledge that Transforms

Booming innovation often coincides with intense speculation in financial markets. Using over a million patents, we document two ways the market valuation of innovation and its economic impact become disconnected during bubbles. Specifically, an innovation raises the stock price of its creator by 40% more than is justified by future outcomes. In contrast, competitors’ stock prices move little despite their profits suffering. We develop a theory of investor disagreement about which firms will succeed that reconciles both the facts, unlike existing models of bubbles. Optimal innovation policy during bubbles must account for the disconnect.

During market-wide shocks that cause large drops in stock prices, firms with more state-endorsed antitakeover provisions (ATPs) experience smaller declines in value. Two channels appear to drive this finding. First, by giving boards more bargaining power to fight opportunistic bids, firms with more ATPs extract higher takeover premiums during market shocks. Second, having more ATPs attenuates the effect of market shocks on firm value by protecting relationship-specific investments with stakeholders from disruptive takeovers. Our results suggest that ATPs benefit shareholders during market shocks when firm values are abnormally low and represent one advantage of incorporating in states with more ATPs.

We estimate the effect of increased access to bank credit on the employment and wages of high- and low-skilled workers. To do so, we consider a bankruptcy reform that led to an expansion of bank credit to Brazilian firms. We use administrative data and exploit cross-sectional variation in the enforcement of the new legislation arising from differences in the congestion of civil courts. We find that the credit expansion led to an increase in the skill intensity of firms and in within-firm returns to skill and to a reallocation of skilled labor from financially unconstrained firms to constrained firms. To rationalize these findings, we design a model in which heterogeneous producers face constraints in their ability to borrow and have production functions featuring capital-skill complementarity. We use this framework to generate an industry-level measure of capital-skill complementarity, which we use to provide direct evidence that the effect of access to credit on skill utilization and the skill premium is driven by a relative complementarity between capital and skilled labor.

ABSTRACT Short selling efficiency (SSE), measured each month by the slope coefficient of cross-sectionally regressing abnormal short interest on a mispricing score, significantly and negatively predicts stock market returns both in-sample and out-of-sample, suggesting that mispricing gets corrected after short sales are executed on the right stocks. We show conceptually and empirically that SSE has favorable predictive ability over aggregate short interest, as SSE reduces the effect of noises in short interest and better captures the amount of aggregate short selling capital devoted to overpricing. The predictive power is stronger during the periods of recession, high volatility, and low public information. In addition, low SSE precedes the months when the CAPM performs well and signals an efficient market. Overall, our evidence highlights the importance of the disposition of short sales in stock markets.