We test the predictions of dividend signaling models using closed-end equity funds that adopt explicit policies committing them to pay minimum dividend yields. These policies represent deliberate attempts to reduce share price undervaluation relative to NAV. Funds that adopt minimum dividend policies experience reductions in their share price discounts, trade at smaller discounts than other funds, earn greater excess returns following policy adoption, and their managers survive longer than other managers do. The results are broadly consistent with the predictions of dividend signaling models, and suggest that high quality closed-end funds can reduce undervaluation via dividend policy.

The liquidity of the market for corporate assets plays an important role in explaining whether a firm divests a business segment, which segment the firm divests, and whether it divests a core segment or an unrelated segment. Firms are more likely to divest segments from industries with a more liquid market for corporate assets, unrelated segments, poorly performing segments, and small segments. Strikingly, the segment with the least liquid market is less likely to be divested than the best-performing segment, while the worst-performing segment is less likely to be divested than the segment with the most liquid market.

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine Reinganum's study which indicates that abnormal returns could not be earned unexpected quarterly earnings information, and to document precisely the response of stock prices to earnings announcements. This study, using a very large sample of stocks and daily returns, represents the most complete and detailed analysis of quarterly earnings reports that has been performed to date. Our results are contrary to those of Reinganum and show that abnormal returns could have been earned almost any time during the 1970's. Our analysis also indicates that risk adjustments matter little in this type of work. Finally, we find that roughly 50% of the adjustment of stock returns to unexpected quarterly earnings occurs over a 90-day period after the earnings are announced.

We provide a model in which irrational investors trade based upon considerations that have no inherent connection to fundamentals. However, trading activity affects market prices, and because of feedback from security prices to cash flows, the irrational trades influence underlying cash flows. As a result, irrational investors can, in some situations, earn abnormal (i.e., risk-adjusted) profits that can exceed the abnormal profits of rational informed investors. Although the trading of irrational investors cause prices to deviate from fundamental values, stock prices follow a random walk.

We examine a sample of connected transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which firms are more likely to expropriate? Does the market anticipate the expropriation by firms? On average, firms announcing connected transactions earn significant negative excess returns, significantly lower than firms announcing similar arm's length transactions. We find limited evidence that firms undertaking connected transactions trade at discounted valuations prior to the expropriation, suggesting that investors cannot predict expropriation and revalue firms only when expropriation does occur.

We present evidence that insured deposit financing shields banks from the full costs of market discipline. Moody's downgrades, indicators of increasing risk, are associated with negative abnormal equity returns that are increasing in the bank's reliance on insured deposits. Moreover, banks raise their use of insured deposits following increases in risk. These findings cast doubt on the ability of capital market participants to effectively discipline bank behavior within the current regulatory environment. More generally, our findings highlight the potential for regulation to undermine market discipline in regulated industries.

We study how information disclosure concerns shape the choice of limited partners (LPs) by venture capitalists (VCs). Late-2002 court rulings prevented public LPs from providing confidentiality to investment managers. The best-performing VCs, but not other managers, responded by excluding public LPs from their new funds. Lost access reduced public LP returns by 1.6 billion relative to 14 billion of their VC commitments. Legislation reducing disclosure, contracts limiting information access, and added fund-of-funds intermediaries helped restore access. These changes focused on protecting portfolio company information, highlighting the importance of proprietary information for VC investing and the potential costs of transparency.

Popular bid–ask spread estimators are downward biased when trading is infrequent. Moreover, they consider only a subset of open, high, low, and close prices and neglect potentially useful information to improve the spread estimate. By accounting for discretely observed prices, this paper derives asymptotically unbiased estimators of the effective bid–ask spread. Moreover, we combine them optimally to minimize the estimation variance and obtain an efficient estimator. Through theoretical analyses, numerical simulations, and empirical evaluations, we show that our efficient estimator dominates other estimators from transaction prices, yields novel insights for measuring bid–ask spreads, and has broad applicability in empirical finance.

We document that (i) debt-to-equity ratios and levered equity betas negatively covary with the market risk premium in distressed firms; (ii) the negative covariance generates negative alphas among those firms. We build a dynamic credit risk model to understand the negative covariance between equity betas and the market risk premium, via endogenous and dynamic debt financing over the business cycles. Because of endogenous debt financing and distress, our model naturally connects the negative failure probability-return relation to the positive distress risk premium-return relation.

Fund trades and stock prices vary systematically with the quarterly reporting cycle. Funds accelerate trades that complete the building of existing positions at quarter-end but delay trades that initiate the building of new positions until the start of the new quarter. Evidence suggests these trade dynamics are driven by a dual desire to make disclosures more informative about future holdings but avoid disclosing incomplete positions. Consistent with disclosure-based motives unrelated to new information about intrinsic values driving these quarterly trade dynamics, both stock price informativeness and commissions paid by funds drop at quarter-end.