We present and test an infinite-horizon, continuous-time model of a firm that can dynamically adjust the use of risk management instruments which seek to reduce product price uncertainty and thereby mitigate financial distress losses and reduce taxes. The dynamic setting relaxes several restrictive assumptions common to static models. In the model, the firm can adjust its use and the hedge ratio and maturity of risk management instruments over time, risk management instruments expire as time progresses, the available maturity of the risk management instruments is shorter than the lifetime of the firm, and transaction costs are associated with initiation and adjustment of risk management contracts. The model produces a number of new time-series and cross-sectional implications on how firms use short-term instruments to hedge long-term cash flow uncertainty. Numerical results describe the optimal timing, adjustment, and rollover of risk management instruments and the choice of contract maturity and hedge ratio in response to changes in the firm's product price. The results show that the structure of transaction costs can have an important effect on the firm's risk management strategy. The model predicts that firms that are either far from financial distress or deep in financial distress neither initiate nor adjust their risk management instruments, while firms between the two extremes initiate and actively adjust their risk management instruments. Using quarterly panel data on gold mining firms between 1993 and 1999, we find evidence of a non-monotonic relation between measures of financial distress and risk management activity consistent with the model. We also provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions with respect to the maturity choice of risk management contracts.

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.

Governance problems have a direct and immediate impact on the effective discount rate guiding investment decisions. Information from a transformed net present value rule and variation in firm-level panel data “reveal” the effective discount rate influencing investment. For the firms most likely to be affected by Jensen agency problems, investment behavior appears to be guided by discount rates less than the market rate by 350–400 basis points. This wedge is reduced for firms with a concentrated ownership structure. Firms facing free cash flow problems have a stock of fixed capital approximately 7–22% higher than would prevail under value maximizing behavior.

For 234 large non-financial corporations using derivatives, we report the magnitude of their risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. If interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices change simultaneously by three standard deviations, the median firm's derivatives portfolio, at most, generates 15 million in cash and 31 million in value. These amounts are modest relative to firm size, and operating and investing cash flows, and other benchmarks. Corporate derivatives use appears to be a small piece of non-financial firms’ overall risk profile. This suggests a need to rethink past empirical research documenting the importance of firms’ derivative use.

With grouping, a sample is sorted by an observable variable and the mean values of the dependent variable in the extreme-ranked groups are compared. We show that test power is maximized when the two extreme groups each contain 27% of the sample, a much larger percentage than that typically used in the literature. This result is not sensitive to the distribution of the dependent variable. We also show that regression is unambiguously more powerful than grouping, even when the independent variable is measured with error.

Investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially. For example, the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information. Traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project. This paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments. We determine the effects of time to build, opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision. For reasonable parameter values, we show how a simple NPV rule can lead to gross errors.

Most affine models of the term structure with stochastic volatility predict that the variance of the short rate should play a ‘dual role’ in that it should also equal a linear combination of yields. However, we find that estimation of a standard affine three-factor model results in a variance state variable that, while instrumental in explaining the shape of the yield curve, is essentially unrelated to GARCH estimates of the quadratic variation of the spot rate process or to implied variances from options. We then investigate four-factor affine models. Of the models tested, only the model that exhibits ‘unspanned stochastic volatility’ (USV) generates both realistic short rate volatility estimates and a good cross-sectional fit. Our findings suggest that short rate volatility cannot be extracted from the cross-section of bond prices. In particular, short rate volatility and convexity are only weakly correlated.

We measure a stock’s exposure to fire sale risk through its ownership links to mutual funds that anticipate significant outflows during periods of systematic outflows from the fund industry. We find that stocks with higher exposure to this risk earn higher average returns: a portfolio that buys (shorts) stocks with the highest (lowest) exposure outperforms by 3-7% annually. Our findings cannot be explained by several known determinants of average returns and support the ex-ante pricing of the risk of fire sales. We conclude that stocks’ exposures to risks inherited from the constraints of shareholders have important implications for stock prices.

Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This differs substantially from focused firms and is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. We also find that, among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. We conclude that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service that is provided by the diversified organizational structure.

Using audit trail data for a sample of NYSE firms we show that medium-size trades are associated with a disproportionately large cumulative stock price change relative to their proportion of all trades and volume. This result is consistent with the predictions of Barclay and Warner's (1993) stealth-trading hypothesis. We find that the source of this disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium-size trades is trades initiated by institutions. This result is robust to various sensitivity checks. Our findings appear to confirm street lore that institutions are informed traders.