Knowledge that Transforms

This paper derives a multibeta representation theorem for pricing assets using arbitrary reference variables that are not necessarily the true factors. Under this theorem, the upper bound on pricing deviations depends upon the correlations not only between the reference variables and the factors but also between the reference variables and the residual risks. A new concept of a well-diversified variable is introduced, which though free of residual risk, may be less than perfectly correlated with the true factors. Welldiversified variables correlated with the factors play a key role in the pricing of assets, since these variables can replace the factors without any loss in pricing accuracy under all linear asset pricing theories.

We document extreme bias and dispersion in the small-sample distributions of four standard regression-based tests of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. The biases arise because of the extreme persistence in short interest rates. We derive approximate analytic expressions for the biases under a simple first-order autoregressive data generating process for the short rate. We then conduct Monte Carlo experiments based on a bias-adjusted first-order autoregressive process for the short rate and for a more realistic bias-adjusted VAR-GARCH model incorporating the short rate and three term spreads. Conducting inference with the small-sample distributions of test statistics rather than with their asymptotic distributions provides a more consistent rejection of the expectations hypothesis. Plausible sources of measurement error in short and long yields do not salvage the expectations hypothesis.

I hypothesize that risk taking is greater in stock thrifts than in mutual thrifts because the residual and fixed claims are separable. I find that stock thrifts exhibit greater profit variability during the 1982–1988 period and that conversions from mutual to stock ownership are associated with increased investment in risky assets and increased profit variability. These findings illustrate the relation between the structure of residual claims, incentives, and firm performance as well as the unintended consequences resulting from changes in thrift regulations.

We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to be residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.

This paper examines the ability of naive investor expectations models to explain the higher returns to contrarian investment strategies. Contrary to Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), we find no systematic evidence that stock prices reflect naive extrapolation of past trends in earnings and sales growth. Building on Bauman and Dowen (1988) and La Porta (1995), however, we find that stock prices appear to naively reflect analysts' biased forecasts of future earnings growth. Further, we find that naive reliance on analysts' forecasts of future earnings growth can explain over half of the higher returns to contrarian investment strategies.

Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System (SOES) allows orders to be submitted by computer, thereby assuring rapid execution at quoted prices. We examine trading in the 20 largest Nasdaq stocks around the time of a rule change that reduced the largest SOES trades from 1000 to 500 shares. We show that SOES trades contain information about short-term price movements and that SOES trading declined dramatically with the rule change. However, quoted and effective spreads were unaffected by the rule change.

This paper examines change in property-liability insurers' risk-taking around enactments of state guaranty fund laws. Our evidence suggests that the risk of insurers' asset portfolios increases following enactments. But this increase in risk is significant only for stock insurers. Our evidence of increased risk-taking following guaranty-fund adoptions suggests that the way these funds are organized creates counterproductive investment incentives, especially for stock companies. Because these laws were enacted by states over the period 1969–1981, our evidence on changes in risk-taking helps resolve statistical problems that have been troublesome for studies of bank deposit insurance.

Unlike operating company IPOs, Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs in the 1970s and 1980s were initially overpriced and subsequently underperformed other REIT securities in the 100 trading days after initial issuance. In contrast. equity REIT IPOs in the 1990s have been underpriced. on average by 3.6%. and have moderately outperformed seasoned equity REITs in the 100 trading days after issuance. We attribute the initial-day underpricing of recent REIT IPOs to greater valuation uncertainty and greater institutional involvement in the recent REIT IPO market. Both of these factors make these issues more susceptible to the ‘winner's curse’.

This paper examines changes in bondholder and shareholder wealth resulting from the 1993 Marriott spinoff. It documents a wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders and a decline in the total value of the firm following the spinoff announcement. Subsequent modifications to the spinoff plan reduced the bondholders' loss, but the value of Marriott's notes and debentures remained 194.6 million below their pre-announcement level on the distribution date. Industry-adjusted shareholder gains during the same period were only 80.6 million. Transaction costs and inefficiencies resulting from the spinoff explain much of the decline in the total value of the firm.

Understanding volatility in emerging capital markets is important for determining the cost of capital and for evaluating direct investment and asset allocation decisions. We provide an approach that allows the relative importance of world and local information to change through time in both the expected returns and conditional variance processes. Our time-series and cross-sectional models analyze the reasons that volatility is different across emerging markets, particularly with respect to the timing of capital market reforms. We find that capital market liberalizations often increase the correlation between local market returns and the world market but do not drive up local market volatility.