Knowledge that Transforms

We use a genetic algorithm to learn technical trading rules for the S&P 500 index using daily prices from 1928 to 1995. After transaction costs, the rules do not earn consistent excess returns over a simple buy-and-hold strategy in the out-of-sample test periods. The rules are able to identify periods to be in the index when daily returns are positive and volatility is low and out when the reverse is true. These latter results can largely be explained by low-order serial correlation in stock index returns.

We model the behavior of Nasdaq momentum traders, also known as SOES bandits. We show, all things being equal, that the profitability of SOES bandits decreases in the bid-ask spread, but increases in the effective tick size. The patterns we observe in the data provide support for the model. We then discuss the plausibility of odd-eighth tick avoidance by market makers as a defense against SOES bandits.

We examine the issue prices of small initial public offerings around the 1993 tax law change that reduced the capital gains tax on qualified small business stock. We compare the actual issue price of new stock with a benchmark price that is not affected by the change in capital gains tax. We find that, after controlling for IPO underpricing, the issue prices of qualifying small business stock after the tax rate change are significantly higher than the issue prices before the change. A control sample of nonqualifying firms shows no significant difference in issue prices.

This paper tests traditional capital structure models against the alternative of a pecking order model of corporate financing. The basic pecking order model, which predicts external debt financing driven by the internal financial deficit, has much greater time-series explanatory power than a static tradeoff model, which predicts that each firm adjusts gradually toward an optimal debt ratio. We show that our tests have the power to reject the pecking order against alternative tradeoff hypotheses. The statistical power of some usual tests of the tradeoff model is virtually nil.

Under Ralston Purina Company's 1986 incentive contract 14 managers would receive 49.1 million in stock if within ten years the stock price closed above 100 for ten consecutive days. While the contract required a 57.8% increase in stock price, it did not motivate managers to create value because the rate of return required to reach 100 in ten years was substantially less than Ralston's cost of equity capital at the time of the contract's adoption. Barring any action by managers that would substantially change the market's expectations about the firm, reaching the 100 hurdle price would be easy. In fact, managers collected the contract's payoffs within five years despite an industry-adjusted loss of $2.1 billion in shareholder value.

The stated justification for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) was to eliminate manipulation. The primary evidence of manipulation was the existence of `stock pools,' through which groups of traders jointly traded in a particular stock. The conclusion of Congress that the pools were manipulative is inconsistent with the evidence produced by the Senate's own investigation. The returns on a sample of pool stocks are also inconsistent with manipulation. These findings suggest that congressional and presidential desires to increase political control over the New York Stock Exchange was a more important motivation for the Exchange Act.

This paper finds that discounts and premiums of closed-end funds reflect the market's assessment of anticipated managerial performance. Using single and multiple benchmarks, we present evidence that there is a significant and positive relation between stock fund premiums and future net asset value performance over the following year. The relation is not caused by the anticipation of future expenses. We also find that bond closed-end funds show no such relation between premium and asset value performance.

Commercial bank entry into securities underwriting can affect underwriter behavior because, unlike investment houses, banks also lend to firms. This raises several issues. Are banks better certifiers of firms’ securities than investment houses? If banks hold equity in firms rather than debt, does this make certification more credible? Would one type of underwriter drive out the other? This paper provides a model for analyzing such issues, and derives several interesting results. First, banks, as lenders to firms, can actually be better certifiers than investment houses. Second, equity holding can hinder banks’ certification ability. Finally, banks and investment houses can co-exist.

We show that higher cash flow volatility is associated with lower average levels of investment in capital expenditures, R&D, and advertising. This association suggests that firms do not use external capital markets to fully cover cash flow shortfalls but rather permanently forgo investment. Cash flow volatility also is associated with higher costs of accessing external capital. Moreover, these higher costs, as measured by some proxies, imply a greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow volatility. Thus, cash flow volatility not only increases the likelihood that a firm will need to access capital markets, it also increases the costs of doing so.

Deregulation provides a natural experiment for examining how governance adapts to structural changes in the business environment. We investigate the evolution of governance structure, characterized by ownership concentration, compensation policy, and board composition, in the U.S. airline industry during a 22-year period surrounding the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Consistent with theory, we find that after deregulation (i) equity ownership is more concentrated, (ii) CEO pay increases, (iii) stock option grants to CEOs increase, and (iv) board size decreases. Airlines’ governance structures gravitate toward the system of governance mechanisms used by unregulated firms. The adaptation process is gradual, however, suggesting that it is costly to alter organizational capital. We also present evidence on the relation between governance structure and firm survival.