Knowledge that Transforms

We show that eurozone bank risks during 2007–2013 can be understood as carry trade behavior. Bank equity returns load positively on peripheral (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, or GIIPS) bond returns and negatively on German government bond returns, which generated carry until the deteriorating GIIPS bond returns adversely affected bank balance sheets. We find support for risk-shifting and regulatory arbitrage motives at banks in that carry trade behavior is stronger for large banks and banks with low capital ratios and high risk-weighted assets. We also find evidence for home bias and moral suasion in the subsample of GIIPS banks.

We study returns on over-the-counter stocks and find that these returns are extremely negative on average. The distribution of OTC stock returns is highly positively skewed: while many of the stocks in our sample become worthless, a few do extremely well. We investigate whether this negative return premium can be rationalized by investors׳ preference for positively skewed payoffs. We show that the equilibrium model of Barberis and Huang (2008) provides a plausible explanation for the negative returns. We also show that OTC stocks that once traded on the regular exchanges perform much better than stocks that originate in the OTC markets.

This paper examines the interaction between the propensity to corrupt (PTC) and firm performance. Using a unique data set of Moscow traffic violations, I construct the PTC of every Muscovite with a driver׳s license. Next, I determine the PTC for the top management of 58,157 privately held firms. I find that a 1 standard deviation increase in management PTC corresponds to a 3.6% increase in income diversion and that firms with corrupt management significantly outperform their counterparts. This study contributes to the literature that characterizes corruption using objective (instead of perception-based) measures and provides evidence regarding the positive aspects of corruption at the firm level.

Fund managers are double agents; they serve both fund investors and owners of management firms. This conflict of interest may result in trading to support securities prices. Tests of this hypothesis in the Spanish mutual fund industry indicate that bank-affiliated mutual funds systematically increase their holdings in the controlling bank stock around seasoned equity issues, at the time of bad news about the controlling bank, before anticipated price drops, and after non-anticipated price drops. The results seem mainly driven by bank managers׳ incentives. Ownership of asset management companies thus matters and can distort capital allocation and asset prices.

Tender offers provide the advantage of substantially faster completion times than mergers. However, a tender offer signals to the target higher demand for its shares and raises its reservation price. In equilibrium, bidders tradeoff speed and cost. Consistent with this theory, we show that deals in more competitive environments and deals with fewer external impediments on execution are more likely to be structured as tender offers. Tender offers also require higher premiums than mergers. Finally, the rivals of the bidding firm realize significantly lower announcement returns and subsequent operating performance in tender offers than in mergers.

Does macroeconomic uncertainty increase or decrease aggregate growth and asset prices? To address this question, we decompose aggregate uncertainty into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ volatility components, associated with positive and negative innovations to macroeconomic growth. We document that in line with our theoretical framework, these two uncertainties have opposite impact on aggregate growth and asset prices. Good uncertainty predicts an increase in future economic activity, such as consumption, output, and investment, and is positively related to valuation ratios, while bad uncertainty forecasts a decline in economic growth and depresses asset prices. Further, the market price of risk and equity beta of good uncertainty are positive, while negative for bad uncertainty. Hence, both uncertainty risks contribute positively to risk premia, and help explain the cross-section of expected returns beyond cash flow risk.

Compared with the market, value, or size factors, momentum has offered investors the highest Sharpe ratio. However, momentum has also had the worst crashes, making the strategy unappealing to investors who dislike negative skewness and kurtosis. We find that the risk of momentum is highly variable over time and predictable. Managing this risk virtually eliminates crashes and nearly doubles the Sharpe ratio of the momentum strategy. Risk-managed momentum is a much greater puzzle than the original version.

This paper combines daily buy and sell institutional trading volume with all news announcements from Reuters. Using institutional order flow (buy volume minus sell volume) we find a variety of evidence that institutions are informed. Institutional trading volume predicts the occurrence of news announcements. Institutional order flow predicts (i) the sentiment of the news; (ii) the stock market reaction on news announcement days; (iii) the stock market reaction on crisis news days; and (iv) earnings announcement surprises. These results suggest that significant price discovery related to news stories occurs through institutional trading prior to the news announcement date.

We study hedge funds that imposed discretionary liquidity restrictions (DLRs) on investor shares during the financial crisis. DLRs prolong fund life, but impose liquidity costs on investors, creating a potential conflict of interest. Ostensibly, funds establish DLRs to limit performance-driven withdrawals that could force fire sales of illiquid assets. However, after they restrict investor liquidity, DLR funds do not reduce illiquid stock sales and underperform a control sample of non-DLR funds. Consequently, DLRs appear to negatively impact fund family reputation. After the crisis, funds from DLR families faced difficulties raising capital and were more likely to cut their fees.

In April 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) was enacted to help revitalize the initial public offering (IPO) market, especially for small firms. During the year ending March 2014, IPO volume and the proportion of small firm issuers was the largest since 2000. Controlling for market conditions, we estimate that the JOBS Act has led to 21 additional IPOs annually, a 25% increase over pre-JOBS levels. Firms with high proprietary disclosure costs, such as biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, increase IPO activity the most. These firms are also more likely to take advantage of the act׳s de-risking provisions, allowing firms to file the IPO confidentially while testing-the-waters.