Knowledge that Transforms

We study trade between an informed seller and an uninformed buyer who have existing inventories of assets similar to those being traded. We show that these inventories could induce the buyer to increase the price (a run-up) but could also make trade impossible (a freeze) and hamper information dissemination. Competition can amplify the run-up by inducing buyers to purchase assets at a loss to prevent competitors from purchasing at lower prices and releasing bad news about inventories. In a dynamic extension, we show that a market freeze could be preceded by high prices. Finally, we discuss empirical and policy implications.

We provide new evidence on the empirical determinants of intertemporal financial decisions. We use an exogenously imposed choice affecting nearly all Croatian retirees to study characteristics associated with choosing a larger, deferred stream of payments over a smaller, more immediate payment. Individuals are more willing to defer if they have higher incomes and are not liquidity constrained, have a longer time horizon because of better health and longer life expectancy, and have stronger bequest motives. Individuals who expect currency devaluation or political risk to reduce the value of future income are more likely to take the earlier income stream.

We document significant reductions in corporate payouts-both dividends and (to a larger extent) share repurchases-during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Payout reductions are more likely in firms with higher leverage, more valuable growth options, and lower cash balances, i.e., those more susceptible to the negative consequences of an external financing shock. Moreover, firms appear to use the proceeds from the reduction in payout to maintain cash levels and to fund investment. These findings are consistent with the view that a shock to the supply of credit (net of demand effects) during the financial crisis increased the marginal benefit of cash retention, leading some firms to turn to payout reductions as a substitute form of financing.

We find that firms are more likely to split their stock if their peer firms have recently done so. The effect is comparable to an increase of 40–50% in the share price. Splitting probability is also increasing in the announcement returns of peer splits. These results are consistent with social learning from peers’ actions and outcomes. The unique features of the setting and various further tests render alternative explanations unlikely. We find no clear benefit in following successful peer splitters. Firms are sometimes suspected to succumb to imitation, and the effect we show could be a case in point.

We present a model in which fire sales propagate shocks across bank balance sheets. When a bank experiences a negative shock to its equity, a natural way to return to target leverage is to sell assets. If potential buyers are limited, then asset sales depress prices, in which case one bank׳s sales impact other banks with common exposures. We show how this contagion effect adds up across the banking sector, and how it can be estimated empirically using balance sheet data. We compute bank exposures to system-wide deleveraging, as well as the spillovers induced by individual banks. Applying the model to European banks, we evaluate a variety of interventions to reduce their vulnerability to fire sales during the sovereign debt crisis.

We show the importance of the collateral lending channel for small business employment over the past decade. Small businesses in areas with greater increases in house prices experienced stronger growth in employment than large firms in the same areas and industries. To identify the role of the collateral lending channel separately from aggregate changes in demand, we show that this effect is more pronounced in industries that need little start-up capital and in which housing collateral is more important. This increase is also present in manufacturing industries, particularly those that ship goods over long distances. In aggregate, the collateral lending channel explains 15–25% of employment variation.

The fastest growing segment of private equity (PE) deals is secondary buyouts (SBOs)—sales from one PE fund to another. Using a comprehensive sample of leveraged buyouts, we investigate whether SBOs are value-maximizing, or reflect opportunistic behavior. To proxy for adverse incentives, we develop buy and sell pressure indexes based on how close PE funds are to the end of their investment period or lifetime, their unused capital, reputation, deal activity, and fundraising frequency. We report that funds under pressure engage more in SBOs. Pressured buyers pay higher multiples, use less leverage, and syndicate less suggesting that their motive is to spend equity. Pressured sellers exit at lower multiples and have shorter holding periods. When pressured counterparties meet, deal multiples depend on differential bargaining power. Moreover, funds that invested under pressure underperform.

We show that macroeconomic growth at the end of the year (fourth quarter or December) strongly influences expected returns on risky financial assets, whereas economic growth during the rest of the year does not. We find this pattern for many different asset classes, across different time periods, and for US and international data. We also show that movements in the surplus consumption ratio of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), a theoretically well-founded measure of time-varying risk aversion linked to macroeconomic growth, influence expected returns stronger during the fourth quarter than the other quarters of the year. Our findings suggest that expected returns, risk aversion, and economic growth are particularly related at the end of the year, when we also expect consumers׳ portfolio adjustments to be concentrated.

This paper examines how political connections affect risk exposure of financial institutions. Using a geography-based measure, I find that politically connected firms have higher leverage and their stocks have higher volatility and beta. Furthermore, prior to the 2008 financial crisis, politically-connected financial firms had higher leverage and were more likely to increase their leverage during the housing bubble in response to local growth in median housing prices. During the crisis, higher leverage was associated with worse performance but being in a state with a US Senator on the Banking Committee was correlated with weakly improved stock returns and reduced bankruptcy probability, highlighting the value of political connections for financial firms.

We examine how executives' behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low “frugality”) and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) with a legal record are more likely to perpetrate fraud. In contrast, we do not find a relation between executives' frugality and the propensity to perpetrate fraud. However, as predicted, we find that unfrugal CEOs oversee a relatively loose control environment characterized by relatively high and increasing probabilities of other insiders perpetrating fraud and unintentional material reporting errors during their tenure. Further, cultural changes associated with an increase in fraud risk are more likely during unfrugal (vs. frugal) CEOs' reigns, including the appointment of an unfrugal CFO, an increase in executives' equity-based incentives to misreport, and a decline in measures of board monitoring intensity.