Knowledge that Transforms

Past studies find that commercial loan spreads are “sticky” in the sense that they do not fully respond to changes in open market rates or observable firm credit risk characteristics. In this paper, we provide evidence that the appearance of stickiness arises, in part, because the intensity of bank screening varies inversely with changes in both observable firm credit risk characteristics and credit market conditions. Our analysis demonstrates that stickiness in loan spreads does not necessarily indicate loan mispricing or misallocation of credit.

We propose a “debt view” to explain the dominant international role of the dollar. Within a simple capital-structure model with debt-currency choice, we show that the “dominant currency” is the one that (1) depreciates in global downturns over horizons of typical debt maturity and (2) has the steepest nominal yield curve. Empirically, we show the dollar fits this description better than other major currencies. The debt view can explain dollar-debt-issuance patterns over the past two decades. It also offers insights into the future of the dominance of the dollar in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.

Information asymmetries are known in theory to lead to inefficiently low credit provision, yet empirical estimates of the resulting welfare losses are scarce. This paper leverages a randomized experiment conducted by a large fintech lender to estimate welfare losses arising from asymmetric information in the market for online consumer credit. Building on methods from the insurance literature, we show how exogenous variation in interest rates can be used to estimate borrower demand and lender cost curves and recover implied welfare losses. While asymmetric information generates large equilibrium price distortions, we find only small overall welfare losses, particularly for high-credit-score borrowers.

I study the sufficiency of macroeconomic information to explain the time-variation in second moments of stock and bond returns, with a particular attention to stock-bond correlations. I propose an external habit model supplemented with realistic non-Gaussian fundamentals estimated solely from macroeconomic data. Intertemporal smoothing and precautionary savings effects – driven by consumption shocks – combine with a time-varying covariance between consumption and inflation to generate large positive and negative stock-bond return correlations. Macroeconomic shocks are most important in explaining second moments of stock and bond returns from the late 1970’s to mid-1990’s and during the Great Recession.

In sharp contrast to most previous crisis episodes, the Treasury market experienced severe stress and illiquidity during the COVID-19 crisis, raising concerns that the safe-haven status of US Treasuries may be eroding. We document large shifts in Treasury ownership and temporary accumulation of Treasury and reverse repo positions on dealer balance sheets during this period. We build a dynamic equilibrium asset pricing model in which dealers subject to regulatory balance sheet constraints intermediate demand/supply shocks from habitat agents and provide repo financing to levered investors. The model predicts that Treasury inconvenience yields, measured as the spread between Treasuries and overnight-index swap rates (OIS), as well as spreads between dealers’ reverse repo and repo rates, should be highly positive during the COVID-19 crisis, as is confirmed in the data. The same model framework, adapted to the institutional setting in 2007–2009, can also explain the negative Treasury-OIS spread observed during the Great Recession.

We estimate a structural model of broker choice to quantitatively decompose the value that institutional investors attach to broker services. Studying over 300 million institutional equity trades, we find that investors are sensitive to both explicit and implicit trading costs and are willing to pay a premium for access to formal and informal research. Formal and informal research account for roughly half of the value generated by brokers. In addition, we use our model to investigate soft dollar arrangements, where research and execution services are bundled, and find that such arrangements allow hedge funds and mutual funds to underreport management fees by 10%.

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of financial intermediation and the economic effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the US. We use loan-level microdata for all PPP loans and high-frequency administrative employment data to present three main findings. First, banks played an important role in mediating program targeting, which helps explain why some funds initially flowed to regions that were less adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, we exploit regional heterogeneity in lending relationships and individual firm-loan matched data to study the role of banks in explaining the employment effects of the PPP. We find the short- and medium-term employment effects of the program were small compared to the program’s size. Third, many firms used the loans to make non-payroll fixed payments and build up savings buffers, which can account for small employment effects and likely reflects precautionary motives in the face of heightened uncertainty. Limited targeting in terms of who was eligible likely also led to many inframarginal firms receiving funds and to a low correlation between regional PPP funding and shock severity. Our findings illustrate how business liquidity support programs affect firm behavior and local economic activity, and how policy transmission depends on the agents delegated to deploy it.

While the percentage of mature firms with classified boards or dual class shares has declined by more than 40% since 1990, the percentage of IPO firms with these structures has doubled over this period. We test whether IPO firms implement these structures optimally or whether they are utilized to allow managers to protect their private benefits of control. Both shareholder voting patterns and changes in firm types going public suggest that the Agency Hypothesis best explains IPO firm's use of dual class, particularly when there is a large voting-cash flow wedge. In contrast, among firms with high information asymmetry, classified board structures are better explained by the Optimal Governance hypothesis.

This paper investigates how individual attention triggers influence financial risk-taking based on a large sample of trading records from a brokerage service that sends standardized push messages on stocks to retail investors. By exploiting the data in a difference-in-differences (DID) setting, we find attention triggers increase investors’ risk-taking. Our DID coefficient implies attention trades carry, on average, a 19 percentage-point-higher leverage than non-attention trades. We provide a battery of cross-sectional analyses to identify the groups of investors and stocks for which this effect is stronger.

We characterize a set of risk-neutral measures associated with a comprehensive class of risk averse investors. From this set, we show how to construct option price bounds and recover the implied γ: a parameter uniquely identifying the marginal investor pricing a given option. Empirically, we find that S&P 500 option prices are reconciled by heterogeneous marginal investors who differ in their assessment of tail risk. This heterogeneity is time-varying, decreases during financial crises, and provides novel insights into the skew patterns of index options. The recovered investors’ preferences related to compensation for downside risk help predict future market returns.