A definition of market adjustment is proposed in terms of the time it takes market attributes to reflect new information. Properties of the proposed definition are discussed. In order to operationalize the concept, a statistical method is introduced to estimate the adjustment times. Empirical examples are used to illustrate the proposed method. Some possible economic interpretations are given. The properties of the estimator are also investigated by simulation and analytical methods.

The fallacy that a many-period expected-utility maximizer should maximize (a) the expected logarithm of portfolio outcomes or (b) the expected average compound return of his portfolio is now understood to rest upon a fallacious use of the Law of Large Numbers. This paper exposes a more subtle fallacy based upon a fallacious use of the Central-Limit Theorem. While the properly normalized product of independent random variables does asymptotically approach a log-normal distribution under proper assumptions, it involves a fallacious manipulation of double limits to infer from this that a maximizer of expected utility after many periods will get a useful approximation to his optimal policy by calculating an efficiency frontier based upon (a) the expected log of wealth outcomes and its variance or (b) the expected average compound return and its variance. Expected utilities calculated from the surrogate log-normal function differ systematically from the correct expected utilities calculated from the true probability distribution. A new concept of ‘initial wealth equivalent’ provides a transitive ordering of portfolios that illuminates commonly held confusions. A non-fallacious application of the log-normal limit and its associated mean-variance efficiency frontier is established for a limit where any fixed horizon period is subdivided into ever more independent sub-intervals. Strong mutual-fund Separation Theorems are then shown to be asymptotically valid.

What makes an asset institutional quality? This paper proposes that one reason is the existing concentration of delegated investors in a market through a liquidity channel. Consistent with this intuition, it documents differences in investor composition across US cities and shows that delegated investors concentrate their investments in cities with higher turnover. It then estimates a search model showing how heterogeneity in liquidity preferences makes some markets more liquid, even when assets have identical cash flows. The paper provides evidence for clientele equilibria arising in frictional asset markets and suggests that a liquidity channel may explain divergent paths in city development.

High-frequency reversals are an economically important characteristic of the returns to tradeable claims to the market portfolio. This paper demonstrates that short-horizon negative autocorrelation can arise in a tractable model of agents with tournament-type preferences. Intuitively, investors act as if they are averse to missing out on a trend, causing the risk premium to move strongly counter to realized returns. The model features fully rationalizing agents, complete markets, and no exogenous transaction demand. Plausible parameterizations can match the autocorrelation in the data. Supporting evidence on novel first and second moment implications is presented.

I study external debt issued by operating subsidiaries of diversified firms. Consistent with Kahn and Winton's [2004. Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions. Journal of Finance 59, 2537–2575] model, where subsidiary debt mitigates asset substitution, I find firms are more likely to use subsidiary debt when their divisions vary more in risk. Consistent with subsidiary debt mitigating the free cash flow problem, I find that subsidiaries are more likely to have their own external debt when they have fewer growth options and higher cash flow than the rest of the firm. Finally, I find that subsidiary debt mitigates the “corporate socialism” and “poaching” problems modeled in theories of internal capital markets.

Municipal bonds trade in decentralized broker-dealer markets, and are underpriced when issued, but unlike equities the average price rises slowly over several days. Newly issued municipal bonds have high levels of price dispersion and the average price rises because the mix of trade sizes changes over time. While large trades occur close to the reoffering price, small trades occur between the reoffering price to as much as 5% above the reoffering price. Using a mixed-distribution model we quantify the losses uninformed traders or issuers give up to broker-dealers.

This paper analyzes endogenous variations in aggregate liquidity that arise in standard representative-agent endowment economies. I introduce a natural definition of liquidity, essentially a shadow elasticity, that characterizes the price impact function or bid/ask spread that a small trader would experience. I compute this quantity for some tractable examples and uncover a rich variety of predictions that, in some cases, appear consistent with levels and covariations observed in the data. The results have important implications for the pricing and hedging of liquidity risk.

This paper specifies the single-beta capital asset pricing model for the pricing of forward foreign exchange contracts from the point of view of a U.S. investor. Parametric specification of the betas as ARCH-like processes explicitly allows for time variation as well as sign variation of the risk premium in the forward foreign exchange market. I estimate the model jointly for four currencies, using a generalized method of moments procedure. The results show significant time variation for the betas and tests of the overidentifying restrictions are generally favorable to the model.