Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the market's reaction to original-issue deep discount (OID) bonds, which are issued at prices well below par and with coupons set below the market rate. Until July 1982 OID debt offered large tax advantages. Before that date stock-price responses to announcements of OID debt are significantly positive, in contrast to the negative, albeit insignificant, responses associated with par debt announcements. No stock-price gains are observed for OID debt issued after the tax advantages are removed. We conclude that in 1981–82 opportunities provided by financial innovation offset the negative information effects typically associated with debt-financing announcements.

We investigate the effects of leveraged buyouts on total factor productivity (TFP) and related variables using a longitudinal database including over 12,000 manufacturing plants. LBOs (particularly MBOs) that occured during 1983–1986 had a strong positive effect on TFP in the first three post-buyout years: plant productivity increased from 2.0% above industry mean in the three pre-buyout years to 8.3% above industry mean in the three post-buyout years. However, 1981 and 1982 buyouts had no significant productivity effect. The employment and compensation of white-collar workers decline following buyouts, but those of blue-collar workers are unchanged.

We show that bid-ask errors in transaction prices are the predominant source of apparent price reversals in the short run for NASDAQ firms. Once we extract measurement errors in prices caused by the bid-ask spread, we find little evidence of market overreaction. On the contrary, we find that security returns are positively, and not negatively, autocorrelated. We also show that bid-ask errors lead to substantial spurious volatility in transaction returns; about half of measured daily return variances can be induced by the bid-ask effect.

This paper examines the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders of Japanese and U.S. firms. Whereas U.S. institutional investors are restricted from doing so, Japanese financial institutions take large equity positions in firms to which they lend, particularly in firms more susceptible to the agency problem. Debt ratios of U.S. firms are negatively related to the firm's potential to engage in risky, suboptimal investments, whereas Japanese debt ratios show no such relation. The evidence is consistent with the notion that the agency problem is mitigated to a greater degree in Japan than in the U.S.

Auctions allocate resources to their highest-valued uses. Yet bankruptcy does not use auctions. Instead judges determine a value and parcel out interests on the assumption that this valuation is correct. Errors inevitable in this process lead many persons to conclude that bankruptcy is inefficient. This essay argues that the conclusion does not follow. The costs of error in valuation may be less than the cost of conducting an auction. Legal rules endure because they are efficient or because they transfer wealth. Transfers are an implausible explanation of the current bankruptcy regime, leaving efficiency as the prevailing explanation.

Research suggests that leveraged buyouts create value through significant operating performance improvements. There is little evidence that buyouts lead to widespread employee layoffs, wage reductions, or wealth transfers from bondholders. LBOs continue to be controversial, however. Future research should focus on the effect of buyouts on firms' strategic investments, buyout firms' performance under difficult economic conditions, and the frequency and costs of financial distress associated with buyouts. Research can also focus on improving the performance of public corporations by examining the individual contributions of debt, management ownership, and corporate governance changes to podt-buyout performance.