Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines how ownership structure and conflicts of interest among shareholders under a poor corporate governance system affected firm performance before the crisis. Using 5,829 Korean firms subject to outside auditing during 1993–1997, the paper finds that firms with low ownership concentration show low firm profitability, controlling for firm and industry characteristics. Controlling shareholders expropriated firm resources even when their ownership concentration was small. Firms with a high disparity between control rights and ownership rights showed low profitability. When a business group transferred resources from a subsidiary to another, they were often wasted, suggesting that “tunneling” occurred. In addition, the negative effects of control-ownership disparity and internal capital market inefficiency were stronger in publicly traded firms than in privately held ones.

This paper examines the relation between the institutional structures of advanced OECD countries and the comparative growth and investment of 27 industries in those countries over the period 1970 to 1995. The paper reports a strong relation between the structure of countries’ financial systems, the characteristics of industries, and the growth and investment of industries in different countries.

Differences in culture, proxied by differences in religion and language, cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection differs across countries. We show that a country's principal religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country's natural openness to international trade, its language, its income per capita, or the origin of its legal system. Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than Protestant countries. A country's natural openness to international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights. Culture proxies are also helpful in understanding how investor rights are enforced across countries.

An extensive collection of continuous-time models of the short-term interest rate is evaluated over data sets that have appeared previously in the literature. The analysis, which uses the simulated maximum likelihood procedure proposed by Durham and Gallant (2002), provides new insights regarding several previously unresolved questions. For single factor models, I find that the volatility, not the drift, is the critical component in model specification. Allowing for additional flexibility beyond a constant term in the drift provides negligible benefit. While constant drift would appear to imply that the short rate is nonstationary, in fact, stationarity is volatility-induced. The simple constant elasticity of volatility model fits weekly observations of the three-month Treasury bill rate remarkably well but is easily rejected when compared with more flexible volatility specifications over daily data. The methodology of Durham and Gallant can also be used to estimate stochastic volatility models. While adding the latent volatility component provides a large improvement in the likelihood for the physical process, it does little to improve bond-pricing performance.

Many firms have stockholders who face severe restrictions on their ability to sell their shares and diversify the risk of their personal wealth. We study the costs of these liquidity restrictions on stockholders using a continuous-time portfolio choice framework. These restrictions have major effects on the optimal investment and consumption strategies because of the need to hedge the illiquid stock position and smooth consumption in anticipation of the eventual lapse of the restrictions. These results provide a number of important insights about the effects of illiquidity in financial markets.

This paper extends the literature on executive compensation by developing and testing a principal-agent model in the context of project selection. The model's focus on executive project selection decisions highlights the multidimensional nature of executive choices that affect the value of the firm. An executive not only makes an effort choice that determines the quality of information on which to base a decision but also sets the decision criteria for selecting projects. A project selection framework is also shown to introduce endogenous uncertainty into compensation that can influence the executive's effort choice. Using an extensive data set, our empirical work supports the main hypotheses of the model, including the significance of executive rank in determining the extent of use of incentive pay in general and equity-based incentive pay in particular.

Using a sample of 1,560 new debt financings, we examine the choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt. The primary determinant of the debt source is the credit quality of the issuer. Firms with the highest credit quality borrow from public sources, firms with medium credit quality borrow from banks, and firms with the lowest credit quality borrow from non-bank private lenders. Non-bank private debt thus plays a unique role in accommodating the financing needs of firms with low credit quality. In addition, the choice of debt source is (weakly) influenced by managerial discretion.

Recent work suggests that intradaily returns can be used to construct estimates of daily return volatility that are more precise than those constructed using daily returns. We measure the economic value of this “realized” volatility approach in the context of investment decisions. Our results indicate that the value of switching from daily to intradaily returns to estimate the conditional covariance matrix can be substantial. We estimate that a risk-averse investor would be willing to pay 50 to 200 basis points per year to capture the observed gains in portfolio performance. Moreover, these gains are robust to transaction costs, estimation risk regarding expected returns, and the performance measurement horizon.

For 234 large non-financial corporations using derivatives, we report the magnitude of their risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. If interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices change simultaneously by three standard deviations, the median firm's derivatives portfolio, at most, generates 15 million in cash and 31 million in value. These amounts are modest relative to firm size, and operating and investing cash flows, and other benchmarks. Corporate derivatives use appears to be a small piece of non-financial firms’ overall risk profile. This suggests a need to rethink past empirical research documenting the importance of firms’ derivative use.

We examine the provision of termination fee clauses in merger agreements between 1989 and 1998. Target-payable fees are observed more frequently when bidding is costly and the potential for information expropriation by third parties is significant. Fee provisions appear to benefit target shareholders through higher deal completion rates and greater negotiated takeover premiums. We conclude that target-payable fees serve as an efficient contracting device, rather than a means by which to deter competitive bidding. Bidder fee provisions appear to be used to secure target wealth gains in deals with higher costs associated with negotiation and bid failure.