Knowledge that Transforms

This paper investigates an attempted delivery squeeze in a bond futures contract traded in London. Using cash and futures trades of dealers and customers, we analyze their strategic trading behavior, price distortion, and learning in a market manipulation setting. We argue that marked differences in settlement failure penalties in the cash and futures markets create conditions that favor squeezes. We recommend that regulators require special flagging of forward term repurchase agreements on the key deliverables that span futures contract maturity dates, and that exchanges mark-to-market their contract specifications more frequently, or consider a cash-settled contract on a basket of bonds.

The paper looks at the behavior of investors in an economy consisting of a production process controlled by a state variable representing the state of technology. The participants in the economy maximize their individual utilities of consumption. Each participant has a constant relative risk aversion. The degrees of risk aversion, as well as the time preference functions, differ across participants. The participants may lend and borrow among themselves, either at a floating short rate, or by issuing or buying term bonds. We derive conditions under which such an economy is in equilibrium, and obtain equations determining interest rates.

The tendency of some investors to hold on to their losing stocks, driven by prospect theory and mental accounting, creates a spread between a stock's fundamental value and its equilibrium price, as well as price underreaction to information. Spread convergence, arising from the random evolution of fundamental values and the updating of reference prices, generates predictable equilibrium prices interpretable as possessing momentum. Empirically, a variable proxying for aggregate unrealized capital gains appears to be the key variable that generates the profitability of a momentum strategy. Controlling for this variable, past returns have no predictability for the cross-section of returns.

We examine the risk characteristics and capital adequacy of hedge funds through the Value-at-Risk approach. Using extensive data on nearly 1,500 hedge funds, we find only 3.7% live and 10.9% dead funds are undercapitalized as of March 2003. Moreover, the undercapitalized funds are relatively small and constitute a tiny fraction of total fund assets in our sample. Cross-sectionally, the variability in fund capitalization is related to size, investment style, age, and management fee. Hedge fund risk and capitalization also display significant time variation. Traditional risk measures like standard deviation or leverage ratios fail to detect these trends.

In the last two decades, emerging stock markets have become less segmented from world stock markets. The average annual decrease in segmentation of 0.055, on a [0,1] scale, reduces the cost of capital (measured by dividend yields) by about 11 basis points, and reduces stock returns by about 4.5%. The decline in expected returns is due to a decrease in two types of segmentation. A fall in local segmentation accounts for about 2/3 of the decline in expected returns. The remaining 1/3 is due to a fall in the level of segmentation of the region. These results, which we document for 30 emerging markets, are robust to the addition of control variables.

Government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the United States. This paper provides cross-country, bank-level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks. It shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. This effect is robust to controlling for country-specific macroeconomic and institutional factors as well as bank-specific factors. The increase in lending is about 11% of a government-owned bank's total loan portfolio or about 0.5% of the median country's GDP per election per government-owned bank.

We study the relative risk of value and growth stocks. We find that time-varying risk goes in the right direction in explaining the value premium. Value betas tend to covary positively, and growth betas tend to covary negatively with the expected market risk premium. Our inference differs from that of previous studies because we sort betas on the expected market risk premium, instead of on the realized market excess return. However, we also find that this beta-premium covariance is too small to explain the observed magnitude of the value premium within the conditional capital asset pricing model.

Financing decisions seem to violate the central predictions of the pecking order model about how often and under what circumstances firms issue equity. Specifically, most firms issue or retire equity each year, and the issues are on average large and not typically done by firms under duress. We estimate that during 1973–2002, the year-by-year equity decisions of more than half of our sample firms violate the pecking order.

This paper proposes a new framework for understanding financial intermediation. In contrast to previous research, we consider a setting in which intermediaries possess no inherent information processing or monitoring advantages. Instead, in an economy with overly optimistic entrepreneurs who require funding from pessimistic investors, we show that intermediaries can arise endogenously. In such a setting, only a rational intermediary will be sufficiently optimistic to find it worthwhile to invest in a technology for screening entrepreneurs' projects, and yet be pessimistic enough to use this technology. Our framework produces implications consistent with heretofore unexplained stylized facts, and conjectures which are thus far untested.

Daily returns for stocks listed on the New York Exchange (NYSE) are not serially correlated while order imbalances on the same stocks are highly persistent. These empirical facts can be reconciled if sophisticated investors react to order imbalances within the trading day by undertaking enough countervailing trades to remove serial dependence over a daily horizon. How long does this actually take? The pattern of intra-day serial dependence reveals that it takes more than five minutes but less than sixty minutes.