Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit for a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies. Although the provision of trade credit increases right after a crisis, it contracts in the following months and years. Firms that are financially more vulnerable to crises extend less trade credit to their customers. We argue that the decline in aggregate trade credit ratios is driven by the reduction in the supply of trade credit that follows a bank credit crunch, consistent with the “redistribution view” of trade credit provision, whereby bank credit is redistributed via trade credit from financially stronger firms to weaker firms.

We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, firm characteristics and market timing on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that chief financial officer's (CFO's), not chief executive officer's (CEO's), incentive has a strong influence on firm's debt structure. When CFOs have incentives to increase (decrease) firm risk, firms obtain volatility-increasing (-decreasing) debt structure. These effects are present only for CFOs who are not subject to high monitoring by board members, CEOs, or corporate control market. Our findings suggest that agency problems at the level of non-CEO executives could be an important driver of various corporate decisions.

We analyze the behavior of over-the-counter currency option prices across moneyness, maturity, and calendar time on two of the most actively traded currency pairs over the past eight years. We find that, on any given date, the conditional risk-neutral distribution of currency returns can show strong asymmetry. This asymmetry varies greatly over time and often switches signs. We develop and estimate a class of models that captures this stochastic skew behavior. Model estimation shows that our stochastic skew models significantly outperform traditional jump-diffusion stochastic volatility models both in sample and out of sample.

Existing empirical studies provide little support for the theoretical prediction that market makers rebalance their inventory through revisions of quoted prices. This study provides evidence that the NYSE's specialist does engage in significant inventory rebalancing, but only when not constrained by the affirmative obligation to provide liquidity imposed by the Price Continuity rule. The evidence also suggests that such obligations are associated with better market quality, but impose significant costs on the specialist. The specialist mitigates these costs through discretionary trading when the rule is not binding. These findings shed light on how exchange rules affect market makers’ behavior and market quality.

This paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the mechanisms linking financial shocks and real activity. In particular, we investigate the growth impact of banking crises on industries with different levels of dependence on external finance. If banks are the key institutions allowing credit constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden loss of these intermediaries in a system in which such intermediaries are important should have a disproportionately contractionary impact on the sectors that flourished due to their reliance on banks. Using data from 38 developed and developing countries that experienced financial crises during the last quarter century, we find that those sectors that are highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially greater contraction of value added during a banking crisis in countries with deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. Our results do not suggest, however, that on net the externally dependent firms fare worse in deep financial systems.

This study examines the intra-industry information transfer effect of credit events, as captured in the credit default swaps (CDS) and stock markets. Positive correlations across CDS spreads imply that contagion effects dominate, whereas negative correlations indicate competition effects. We find strong evidence of contagion effects for Chapter 11 bankruptcies and competition effects for Chapter 7 bankruptcies. We also introduce a purely unanticipated event, in the form of a large jump in a company's CDS spread, and find that this leads to the strongest evidence of credit contagion across the industry. These results have important implications for the construction of portfolios with credit-sensitive instruments.

We investigate how corporate governance impacts firm value by comparing the value and use of cash holdings in poorly and well-governed firms. We show that governance has a substantial impact on value through its impact on cash: 1.00 of cash in a poorly governed firm is valued at only 0.42 to $0.88. Good governance approximately doubles this value. Furthermore, we show that firms with poor corporate governance dissipate cash quickly in ways that significantly reduce operating performance. This negative impact of large cash holdings on future operating performance is cancelled out if the firm is well governed.

Existing term structure models of defaultable bonds have often underestimated corporate bond spreads. A potential problem is that investors’ taxes are ignored in these models. We propose a pricing model that accounts for stochastic default probability and differential tax treatments for discount and premium bonds. By estimating parameters directly from bond data, we obtain significantly positive estimates for the income tax rate of a marginal corporate bond investor after 1986. This contrasts sharply with the previous finding that the implied tax rates for Treasury bonds are close to zero. Results show that taxes explain a substantial portion of corporate bond spreads.

This paper presents evidence on the relation between hedge fund returns and restrictions imposed by funds that limit the liquidity of fund investors. The excess returns of funds with lockup restrictions are approximately 4–7% per year higher than those of nonlockup funds. The average alpha of all funds is negative or insignificant after controlling for lockups and other share restrictions. Also, a negative relation is found between share restrictions and the liquidity of the fund's portfolio. This suggests that share restrictions allow funds to efficiently manage illiquid assets, and these benefits are captured by investors as a share illiquidity premium.

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects. As a result, the local lender inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates the inefficiency by increasing the local lender's payoff from precisely those marginally profitable projects that she inefficiently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that technological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships.