Knowledge that Transforms

Many theories in finance imply monotonic patterns in expected returns and other financial variables. The liquidity preference hypothesis predicts higher expected returns for bonds with longer times to maturity; the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) implies higher expected returns for stocks with higher betas; and standard asset pricing models imply that the pricing kernel is declining in market returns. The full set of implications of monotonicity is generally not exploited in empirical work, however. This paper proposes new and simple ways to test for monotonicity in financial variables and compares the proposed tests with extant alternatives such as t-tests, Bonferroni bounds, and multivariate inequality tests through empirical applications and simulations.

Using data on identical and fraternal twins’ complete financial portfolios, we decompose the cross-sectional variation in investor behavior. We find that a genetic factor explains about one-third of the variance in stock market participation and asset allocation. Family environment has an effect on the behavior of young individuals, but this effect is not long-lasting and disappears as an individual gains experience. Frequent contact among twins results in similar investment behavior beyond a genetic factor. Twins who grew up in different environments still display similar investment behavior. Our interpretation of a genetic component of the decision to invest in the stock market is that there are innate differences in factors affecting effective stock market participation costs. We attribute the genetic component of asset allocation—the relative amount invested in equities and the portfolio volatility—to genetic variation in risk preferences.

This paper provides evidence that an underwriter is better able to certify an equity issue if it has a lending relationship with the firm. An announcement of being underwritten by the firm’s lending-relationship bank reduces ex post information asymmetry, thereby improving the announcement return. Further, because this reduction in information asymmetry effectively disseminates what was previously the lending bank’s private information, it decreases its affiliated market maker’s information advantage, thus reducing its contribution to price discovery and liquidity. These results provide evidence on the value of information production and transmission by banks, and more generally on the role of external parties in reducing information asymmetry.

We quantify the empirical relevance of the pecking order hypothesis using a novel empirical model and testing strategy that addresses statistical power concerns with previous tests. While the classificatory ability of the pecking order varies significantly depending on whether one interprets the hypothesis in a strict or liberal (e.g., “modified” pecking order) manner, the pecking order is never able to accurately classify more than half of the observed financing decisions. However, when we expand the model to incorporate factors typically attributed to alternative theories, the predictive accuracy of the model increases dramatically—accurately classifying over 80% of the observed debt and equity issuances. Finally, we show that what little pecking order behavior can be found in the data is driven more by incentive conflicts, as opposed to information asymmetry.

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996–2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

The market for auction rate securities (ARS) made headlines during the second week of February 2008 when auctions at which the bonds’ interest rates reset experienced a wave of “failures.” Contrary to headlines that attribute the failures to a “frozen” market or investors’ “irrationality,” we find that (1) even at their height, less than 50% of ARS experienced auction failures, (2) the likelihood of auction failure was directly related to the level of the bonds’ “maximum auction rates,” (3) the implied market clearing yields of bonds with failed auctions were significantly above their maximum auction rates, and (4) ARS yields were generally higher than yields of various cash equivalent investment alternatives. We infer that investors priced the possibility of auctions failures into ARS yields and rationally declined to bid for bonds for which required market yields exceeded their maximum auction rates.

This paper studies the importance of heterogeneous beliefs for the dynamics of asset prices. We focus on currency markets, where the absence of short-selling constraints allows us to perform sharper tests of theoretical predictions. Using a unique data set with detailed information on foreign-exchange forecasts, we construct an empirical proxy for differences in beliefs. We show that this proxy has a strong effect on the implied volatility of currency options beyond the volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals. We document that differences in beliefs impact also on the shape of the implied volatility smile, on the volatility risk-premiums, and on future currency returns.

Theory predicts sizeable exchange rate (FX) exposure for many firms. However, empirical research has not documented such exposures. To examine this discrepancy, we extend prior theoretical results to model a global firm's FX exposure and show empirically that firms pass through part of currency changes to customers and utilize both operational and financial hedges. For a typical sample firm, pass-through and operational hedging each reduce exposure by 10–15%. Financial hedging with foreign debt, and to a lesser extent FX derivatives, decreases exposure by about 40%. The combination of these factors reduces FX exposures to observed levels.

We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever US government intervention in the financial sector announced during the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by 130 billion (bn) at a taxpayers’ cost of 21–44 billion with a net benefit between 86 and $109bn. By looking at the limited cross section, we infer that this net benefit arises from a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, which we estimate would destroy 22% of the enterprise value. The big winners of the plan were the bondholders of the three former investment banks and Citigroup, while the losers were JP Morgan shareholders and the US taxpayers.

We introduce a new analytical approach to price American options. Using an explicit and intuitive proxy for the exercise rule, we derive tractable pricing formulas using a short-maturity asymptotic expansion. Depending on model parameters, this method can accurately price options with time-to-maturity up to several years. The main advantage of our approach over existing methods lies in its straightforward extension to models with stochastic volatility and stochastic interest rates. We exploit this advantage by providing an analysis of the impact of volatility mean-reversion, volatility of volatility, and correlations on the American put price.