Knowledge that Transforms

We use a previously unexploited data base, specifically debt offerings by AT&T and its subsidiaries in the period 1970–1974, to examine the relative costliness of competitive and negotiated offerings. A sample based on the experience of a single issuer allows us to minimize the influence of agency considerations and differential riskiness of the issuers. We find no systematic ex post cost difference, and we also find that negotiation was chosen during comparatively unsettled times.

We empirically analyze the information hypothesis that the separation of a firm's divisions into independently traded units through a spin-off enhances value because it mitigates information asymmetry about the firm. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms that engage in spin-offs have higher levels of information asymmetry compared to their industry and size matched counterparts and the information problems decrease significantly after the spin-off. The gains around spin-offs are positively related to the degree of information asymmetry, and this relation is more pronounced for firms with fewer negative synergies between divisions. Finally, firms with higher growth opportunities and firms in need of external capital show a higher propensity to engage in spin-offs. They also raise more capital following a spin-off, which is consistent with the view that these firms mitigate information asymmetry before approaching the capital market for funds.

This paper considers whether stock price elasticity affects corporate financial decisions. Basic economic principles and the existing theoretical literature predict that firms choosing the Dutch auction instead of the fixed price tender offer should be those firms expecting to face greater stock price elasticity. Econometric analysis suggests that firms choosing the Dutch auction instead of the fixed price tender offer between 1984 and 1989 are indeed those firms expecting to face greater stock elasticity, even though the average realized elasticities of the firms conducting the various tender offers fail to be significantly different. The expected elasticity remains an important determinant of the tender offer choice even when allowing for firm characteristics associated with the choice of repurchase method. Firms facing greater elasticity are also characterized. The findings suggest that expected stock price elasticity may be an important determinant of corporate financial decisions that affect the supply of, or demand for, stock.

Open-end equity funds provide a diversified equity positions with little direct cost to investors for liquidity. This study documents a statistically significant indirect cost in the form of a negative relation between a fund's abnormal return and investor flows. Controlling for this indirect cost of liquidity changes the average fund's abnormal return (net of expenses) from a statistically significant −1.6% per year to a statistically insignificant −0.2% and also fully explains the negative market-timing performance found in this and other studies of mutual fund returns. Thus, the common finding of negative return performance at open-end mutual funds is attributable to the costs of liquidity-motivated trading.

We examine the role of limit-order traders and specialists in the market-making process. We find that a large portion of posted bid–ask quotes originates from the limit-order book without direct participation by specialists, and that competition between traders and specialists has a significant impact on the bid–ask spread. Specialists’ spreads are widest at the open, narrow until late morning, and then level off. The U-shaped intraday pattern of spreads largely reflects the intraday variation in spreads established by limit-order traders. Lastly, the intraday variation in limit-order spreads is significantly related to the intraday variation in limit-order placements and executions.