Recent evidence indicates irrational behavior among retail investors. They hold onto losses and sell winners in a manner consistent with the disposition effect. Market professionals often use the term “discipline” to indicate trading strategies that minimize potential behavioral influences. We investigate the nature of trading discipline and whether professional traders are able to avoid the costly irrational behaviors found in retail populations. The full-time traders in our sample hold onto losses significantly longer than gains, but we find no evidence of costs associated with this behavior. The successful floor futures traders in our sample exhibit trading behavior characterized as rational and disciplined. Moreover, measures of relative trading discipline have predictive power for subsequent trading success.
We present and test an infinite-horizon, continuous-time model of a firm that can dynamically adjust the use of risk management instruments which seek to reduce product price uncertainty and thereby mitigate financial distress losses and reduce taxes. The dynamic setting relaxes several restrictive assumptions common to static models. In the model, the firm can adjust its use and the hedge ratio and maturity of risk management instruments over time, risk management instruments expire as time progresses, the available maturity of the risk management instruments is shorter than the lifetime of the firm, and transaction costs are associated with initiation and adjustment of risk management contracts. The model produces a number of new time-series and cross-sectional implications on how firms use short-term instruments to hedge long-term cash flow uncertainty. Numerical results describe the optimal timing, adjustment, and rollover of risk management instruments and the choice of contract maturity and hedge ratio in response to changes in the firm's product price. The results show that the structure of transaction costs can have an important effect on the firm's risk management strategy. The model predicts that firms that are either far from financial distress or deep in financial distress neither initiate nor adjust their risk management instruments, while firms between the two extremes initiate and actively adjust their risk management instruments. Using quarterly panel data on gold mining firms between 1993 and 1999, we find evidence of a non-monotonic relation between measures of financial distress and risk management activity consistent with the model. We also provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions with respect to the maturity choice of risk management contracts.
This study examines the emergence of the Bulgarian stock market and the role of controlling blockholders. A new approach using mass privatization auction data measures the premium for control and demonstrates that, in the absence of legal constraints, majority owners extract more than 85% of firm value as private benefits of control. Institutional investors form portfolios of predominantly controlling positions or participate in majority coalitions. Ownership stakes cluster at 51%. After the privatized companies begin trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, majority-owned firms trade at 40–60% discounts. Overall, the results support the Fama and Jensen (J. law Ecorg 26 (1983) 301) view that majority-owned firms cannot persist as publicly traded corporations if the expropriating activities of controlling blockholders are not legally restricted.
I develop a framework to analyze demand curves for multiple risky securities at extended horizons in a setting with limits-to-arbitrage. Following an unexpected change in uninformed investor demand for several assets, I predict returns of each security to be proportional to the contribution of that security's demand shock to the risk of a diversified arbitrage portfolio. I show that securities that are not affected by demand shocks but are correlated with securities undergoing changes in demand should experience returns related to their hedging role in arbitrageurs' portfolios. Finally, I predict a negative cross-sectional relation between post-event returns and the initial return associated with the change in demand. I confirm these predictions using data from a unique redefinition of the Nikkei 225 index in Japan, in which 255 stocks simultaneously undergo significant changes in index investor demand, causing more than ¥2,000 billion of trading in one week and large price changes followed by subsequent reversals for all of the reweighted stocks.
This paper examines how financial markets responded to the longest circuit breaker in American financial history: the four-month suspension of trading on the New York Stock Exchange following the outbreak of World War I. The suspension that began on July 31, 1914 fostered a substitute trading forum called the New Street market. Trading on New Street began almost immediately and offered economically meaningful liquidity services despite its impaired price transparency. A simple cross-sectional model of bid–ask spreads on New Street demonstrates that New Street liquidity responded to economic incentives. New Street's success implies that, from a public policy perspective, expensive back-up trading facilities are not required to preserve liquidity during a trading suspension in established markets. Back-up records of share ownership and transfer facilities, however, are crucial to maintaining liquidity.
This paper finds that default betas are significantly related to the cross-section of average bond returns even after controlling for characteristics such as duration, ratings, and yield-to-maturity. Among characteristics, only yield-to-maturity is significantly related to average bond returns after controlling for default and term betas. The default and term factors are able to price the returns of beta-sorted portfolios better than they do the returns of yield-sorted portfolios. The magnitude of the ex ante Sharpe ratio generated by yield-sorted portfolios suggests non-risk-based explanations. Overall, given the elusive nature of systematic risk in empirical asset pricing, the central finding of our paper is that systematic risk matters for corporate bonds.
We compare pricing and exit decisions of discounters across the business cycle. Cities containing high debt and/or low efficiency firms display higher prices during non-recession years. During recessions, prices increase in cities with less efficient incumbents, but decrease in cities with a mix of high and low debt firms. High debt firms are more likely to exit cities with lower prices, and high debt exiting firms are more likely to be efficient. Apparently, low debt firms strategically lower prices during recessions to force exit of efficient, financially constrained rivals. Weaker competitors face another cost. New entrants locate closer.
This paper measures the mean, standard deviation, alpha, and beta of venture capital investments, using a maximum likelihood estimate that corrects for selection bias. The bias-corrected estimation neatly accounts for log returns. It reduces the estimate of the mean log return from 108% to 15%, and of the log market model intercept from 92% to -7%. The selection bias correction also dramatically attenuates high arithmetic average returns: it reduces the mean arithmetic return from 698% to 59%, and it reduces the arithmetic alpha from 462% to 32%. I confirm the robustness of the estimates in a variety of ways. I also find that the smallest Nasdaq stocks have similar large means, volatilities, and arithmetic alphas in this time period, confirming that the remaining puzzles are not special to venture capital.
This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also provide suggestive evidence that staggered boards bring about, and not merely reflect, a reduced firm value. Finally, we show that the correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards that are established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in the company's bylaws (which shareholders can amend).
We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder–bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.