Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies whether incorporating business cycle predictors benefits a real time optimizing investor who must allocate funds across 3,123 NYSE-AMEX stocks and cash. Realized returns are positive when adjusted by the Fama-French and momentum factors as well as by the size, book-to-market, and past return characteristics. The investor optimally holds small-cap, growth, and momentum stocks and loads less (more) heavily on momentum (small-cap) stocks during recessions. Returns on individual stocks are predictable out-of-sample due to alpha variation, whereas the equity premium predictability, the major focus of previous work, is questionable.

We examine market behavior around earnings announcements to understand the consequences of the increased disclosure that non-U.S. firms face when listing shares in the U.S. We find that absolute return and volume reactions to earnings announcements typically increase significantly once a company cross-lists in the U.S. Furthermore, these increases are greatest for firms from developed countries and for firms that pursue over-the-counter listings or private placements, which do not have stringent disclosure requirements. Additional tests support the hypothesis that it is changes in the individual firm's disclosure environment, rather than changes in its market liquidity, ownership, or trading venue, that explain our findings.

This paper develops an agency model in which stock-based compensation is a double-edged sword, inducing managers to exert productive effort but also to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance. We examine how the potential for manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay-for-performance sensitivity and derive several new cross-sectional implications that are consistent with recent empirical studies. In addition, we analyze the impact of recent regulatory changes contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and show how policies intended to increase firm value by reducing misrepresentation can actually reduce firm value or increase the upward bias in manipulated disclosures.

This paper investigates the components of liquidity risk that are important for understanding asset-pricing anomalies. Firm-level liquidity is decomposed into variable and fixed price effects and estimated using intraday data for the period 1983–2001. Unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations of the variable component rather than the fixed component of liquidity are shown to be priced within the context of momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) portfolio returns. As the variable component is typically associated with private information [e.g., Kyle, 1985. Econometrica 53, 1315–1335], the results suggest that a substantial part of momentum and PEAD returns can be viewed as compensation for the unexpected variations in the aggregate ratio of informed traders to noise traders.

Do external finance constraints affect the timing of large investment projects? Simulations of a model with fixed capital-stock adjustment costs establish the hypothesis that external finance constraints lower a firm's investment hazard: the probability of undertaking a large project today as a function of the time since the last project. Hazard model estimation that controls for productivity and adjustment costs supports this hypothesis. Small firms that distribute cash to shareholders have higher hazards than small firms that do not; very small firms have lower hazards than small firms; small stand-alone firms have significantly lower hazards than small segments of conglomerates.

I examine the enormous trading volume in the first two days of trading following an initial public offering (IPO) with a sample of Nasdaq IPOs. The composition of trading varies widely with the initial return and not all trading is investor-related. Cold IPOs have a high proportion of interdealer sell trades, whereas hot IPOs have balanced investor buying and selling. Market makers hold zero inventory throughout trading, offsetting any investor inventory imbalance with a trade with the lead underwriter. The paper also helps resolve the disconnect reported in the literature between high initial trading volume and low “flipping” activity.

The empirical literature provides conflicting assessments about how firms choose their capital structures. Distinguishing among the three main hypotheses (“tradeoff”, pecking order, and market timing) requires that we know whether firms have long-run leverage targets and (if so) how quickly they adjust toward them. Yet many previous researchers have applied empirical specifications that fail to recognize the potential for incomplete adjustment. A more general, partial-adjustment model of firm leverage indicates that firms do have target capital structures. The typical firm closes about one-third of the gap between its actual and its target debt ratios each year.

We provide a model in which irrational investors trade based upon considerations that have no inherent connection to fundamentals. However, trading activity affects market prices, and because of feedback from security prices to cash flows, the irrational trades influence underlying cash flows. As a result, irrational investors can, in some situations, earn abnormal (i.e., risk-adjusted) profits that can exceed the abnormal profits of rational informed investors. Although the trading of irrational investors cause prices to deviate from fundamental values, stock prices follow a random walk.

Recent studies suggest that the conditional CAPM holds, period by period, and that time-variation in risk and expected returns can explain why the unconditional CAPM fails. In contrast, we argue that variation in betas and the equity premium would have to be implausibly large to explain important asset-pricing anomalies like momentum and the value premium. We also provide a simple new test of the conditional CAPM using direct estimates of conditional alphas and betas from short-window regressions, avoiding the need to specify conditioning information. The tests show that the conditional CAPM performs nearly as poorly as the unconditional CAPM, consistent with our analytical results.

We examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns. These returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position. A unique Desperation Index is employed to determine the current status of a firm's internal productivity. We find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing-type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines.