Knowledge that Transforms

We explore the sharp uptrend in recent trading activity and accompanying changes in market efficiency. Higher turnover has been associated with more frequent smaller trades, which have progressively formed a larger fraction of trading volume over time. Evidence indicates that secular decreases in trading costs have influenced the turnover trend. Turnover has increased the most for stocks with the greatest level of institutional holdings, suggesting professional investing as a key contributor to the turnover trend. Variance ratio tests suggest that more institutional trading has increased information-based trading. Intraday volatility has decreased and prices conform more closely to random walk in recent years. The sensitivity of turnover to past returns has increased and cross-sectional predictability of returns has decreased significantly, revealing a more widespread use of quantitative trading strategies that allow for more efficient securities prices.

We examine stock exchange trading rules for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker–agency conflict, across countries and over time, in 42 stock exchanges around the world. Some stock exchanges have extremely detailed rules that explicitly prohibit specific manipulative practices, but others use less precise and broadly framed rules. We create new indices for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker–agency conflict based on the specific provisions in the trading rules of each stock exchange. We show that differences in exchange trading rules, over time and across markets, significantly affect liquidity.

We find the disparity between long-term and short-term analyst forecasted earnings growth is a robust predictor of future returns and long-term analyst forecast errors. After adjusting for industry characteristics, stocks whose long-term earnings growth forecasts are far above or far below their implied short-term forecasts for earnings growth have negative and positive subsequent risk-adjusted returns along with downward and upward revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth, respectively. Additional results indicate that investor inattention toward firm-level changes in long-term earnings growth is responsible for these risk-adjusted returns.

This paper investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions [e.g., staggered boards and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-chairman duality] are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that reduce executive pay, increase proxy access, and ban such governance provisions are value-enhancing. In contrast, another view of governance suggests that observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and management. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that regulate such governance choices are value destroying. Consistent with the latter view, we find that the abnormal returns to recent events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, decreasing in CEO pay, decreasing in the number of large blockholders, decreasing in the ease by which small institutional investors can access the proxy process, and decreasing in the presence of a staggered board.

We propose forecasting separately the three components of stock market returns—the dividend–price ratio, earnings growth, and price–earnings ratio growth—the sum-of-the-parts (SOP) method. Our method exploits the different time series persistence of the components and obtains out-of-sample R-squares (compared with the historical mean) of more than 1.3% with monthly data and 13.4% with yearly data. This compares with typically negative R-squares obtained in a similar experiment with predictive regressions. The performance of the SOP method comes mainly from the dividend–price ratio and earnings growth components, and the robustness of the method is due to its low estimation error. An investor who timed the market using our method would have had a Sharpe ratio gain of 0.3.

Young agents with low wealth-income ratios counter factually hold more stock than young, rich agents and old agents using the standard portfolio choice model with i.i.d. stock returns and labor income. This paper matches the countercyclical volatility and procyclical mean of U.S. labor income and finds that, consistent with U.S. data, young, poor agents now hold less stock than both young, rich agents and old agents, and no stock a large fraction of the time. Our results suggest that the predictability of labor income growth at a business-cycle frequency, particularly the countercyclical variation in volatility, plays an important role in a young agent's decision making about her portfolio's stock holding.

Firms deliberately but temporarily deviate from permanent leverage targets by issuing transitory debt to fund investment. Leverage targets conservatively embed the option to issue transitory debt, with the evolution of leverage reflecting the sequence of investment outlays. We estimate a dynamic capital structure model with these features and find that it replicates industry leverage very well, explains debt issuances/repayments better than extant tradeoff models, and accounts for the leverage changes accompanying investment “spikes.” It generates leverage ratios with slow average speeds of adjustment to target, which are dampened by intentional temporary movements away from target, not debt issuance costs.

Event-study driven research has produced a consensus that loans are unique relative to other financial contracts. But these studies assume that small samples of loan announcements adequately represent the loan population. We find that loan announcements are rare and driven by factors such as information asymmetry and perceived materiality. We show that the sample used by Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) fails to represent the loan universe and that significant abnormal announcement returns are confined to their smallest firms. Our sample, which better represents the loan population, produces an abnormal return insignificantly different from zero. The findings suggest that self-selection bias affects extant loan announcement research and do not support the views that loans are a special form of finance or that private and public debt differ in significant ways. Were all loans to be announced, the average abnormal return would likely be insignificant.

We study the evolution of Korean chaebols (business groups) using ownership data. Chaebols grow vertically (as pyramids) when the controlling family uses well-established group firms (“central firms”) to acquire firms with low pledgeable income and high acquisition premiums. Chaebols grow horizontally (through direct ownership) when the family acquires firms with high pledgeable income and low acquisition premiums. Central firms trade at a relative discount, due to shareholders’ anticipation of value-destroying acquisitions. Our evidence is consistent with the selection of firms into different positions in the chaebol and ascribes the underperformance of pyramidal firms to a selection effect rather than tunneling.

This paper presents an option positioning that allows us to infer forward variances from option portfolios. The forward variances we construct from equity index options help to predict (i) growth in measures of real economic activity, (ii) Treasury bill returns, (iii) stock market returns, and (iv) changes in variance swap rates. Our yardstick for measuring predictive ability is both individual and joint parameter statistical significance within a market, as well as across a set of markets.