Knowledge that Transforms

Traditional performance evaluation measures do not account for tail events and rare disasters. To address this issue, we reinterpret the riskiness measures of Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster and Hart (2009) as performance indices. We derive the moment properties of these indices and their sensitivity to rare disasters and show that they are consistent with the asset pricing literature. As applications, we show that “anomalous” investment strategies such as “momentum” or investment in private equity lose much of their glamour when accounting for high moments and rare events. Furthermore, using the indices to select mutual funds results in desirable high-moment properties out of sample.

How does the speed by which information diffuses affect its value to a stock market investor? In a structural model solved in closed-form, this speed has two opposing effects on the empirically dominant term of the value of information. Faster-diffusing information means quicker and less noisy profits, but, also increases competing informed trading, impounding more information into prices and eroding profits. Structural empirical analysis of stock market reaction to drug approvals using media coverage as a proxy for the transmission rate of information finds that the value of information is hump-shaped in its future transmission rate. Moreover, the estimated amount of noise trading is small.

Using an extensive data set on corporate bond defaults in the US from 1866 to 2010, we study the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those resulting from banking crises. During the past 150 years, the US has experienced many severe corporate default crises in which 20–50% of all corporate bonds defaulted. Although the total par amount of corporate bonds has at times rivaled the amount of bank loans outstanding, we find that corporate default crises have far fewer real effects than do banking crises. These results provide empirical support for current theories that emphasize the unique role that banks and the credit and collateral channels play in amplifying macroeconomic shocks.

We examine whether access to management at broker-hosted investor conferences leads to more informative research by analysts. We find analyst recommendation changes have larger immediate price impacts when the analyst׳s firm has a conference-hosting relation with the company. The effect increases with hosting frequency and is strongest in the days following the conference. Conference-hosting brokers also issue more informative, accurate, and timely earnings forecasts than non-hosts. Our findings suggest that access to management remains an important source of analysts׳ informational advantage in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure world.

We develop a multivariate dynamic term structure model, which takes into account the nonlinear (time-varying) relation between interest rates and the state of the economy. In contrast to the classical term structure literature, in which nonlinearities are captured by increasing the number of latent state variables or by latent regime shifts, in our no-arbitrage framework the regimes are governed by thresholds and are directly linked to economic fundamentals. Specifically, starting from a simple monetary policy model for the short rate, we introduce a parsimonious and tractable model for the yield curve, which takes into account the possibility of regime shifts in the behavior of the Federal Reserve. In our empirical analysis, we show the merit of our approach three dimensions: interpretable bond dynamics, accurate short end yield curve pricing, and yield curve implications.

We use data on UK banks׳ minimum capital requirements to study the impact of changes to bank-specific capital requirements on cross-border bank loan supply from 1999Q1 to 2006Q4. By examining a sample in which each recipient country has multiple relationships with UK-resident banks, we are able to control for demand effects. We find a negative and statistically significant effect of changes to banks׳ capital requirements on cross-border lending: a 100 basis point increase in the requirement is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of cross-border credit of 5.5 percentage points. We also find that banks tend to favor their most important country relationships, so that the negative cross-border credit supply response in “core” countries is significantly less than in others. Banks tend to cut back cross-border credit to other banks (including foreign affiliates) more than to firms and households, consistent with shorter maturity, wholesale lending which is easier to roll off and may be associated with weaker borrowing relationships.

Using novel data on bank applications to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Bailed-out banks initiate riskier loans and shift assets toward riskier securities after receiving government support. However, this shift in risk occurs mostly within the same asset class and, therefore, remains undetected by regulatory capital ratios, which indicate improved capitalization at bailed-out banks. Consequently, these banks appear safer according to regulatory ratios, but show an increase in volatility and default risk. These findings are robust to controlling for credit demand and account for selection of TARP recipients by exploiting banks׳ geography-based political connections as an instrument for bailout approvals.

We study business groups׳ internal capital markets using a unique data set on intra-group lending in Chile (1990–2009). In line with groups׳ financing advantage, firms that borrow internally have higher investment, leverage, and return on equity (ROE) than other firms. At the margin, controlling shareholders have higher cash-flow rights in borrowing firms than in lending firms. However, there is no robust evidence of minority shareholders losing out from intra-group loans as tunneling predicts. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that strict regulation and disclosure requirements for intra-group loans, which are features of the Chilean market, reduce the risk of expropriation in pyramids.

We study the optimal composition of corporate boards. Directors can be either monitoring or advisory types. Monitoring constrains the empire-building tendency of chief executive officers (CEOs). If shareholders control the board nomination process, a non-monotonic relation ensues between agency problems and board composition. To preempt CEO entrenchment, shareholders may assemble an adviser-heavy board. If a powerful CEO influences the nomination process, this may result in a more monitor-heavy board. Regulations strengthening the monitoring role of boards can be harmful in precisely those cases in which agency problems are severe or in which CEO entrenchment is a threat to corporate governance.

We study the profitability of traders in two fully electronic and highly liquid markets: the Dow and Standard & Poor׳s 500 e-mini futures markets. Using unique information that identify counterparties to a transaction, we show and seek to explain the fact that the network pattern of trades captures the relations between behavior in the market and returns. Our approach includes a simple representation of how much a shock is amplified by the network and how widely it is transmitted. This representation provides a possible shorthand for understanding the consequences of a fat-finger trade, a withdrawing of liquidity, or other market shock.