Knowledge that Transforms

We consider a dynamic multifactor model of investment with financing imperfections, adjustment costs and fixed and variable capital. We use the model to derive a test of financing constraints based on a reduced form variable capital equation. Simulation results show that this test correctly identifies financially constrained firms even when the estimation of firms’ investment opportunities is very noisy. In addition, the test is well specified in the presence of both concave and convex adjustment costs of fixed capital. We confirm empirically the validity of this test on a sample of small Italian manufacturing companies.

Using a unique panel dataset that tracks corporate board development from a firm's IPO through 10 years later, we find that: (i) board size and independence increase as firms grow and diversify over time; (ii) board size—but not board independence—reflects a tradeoff between the firm-specific benefits and costs of monitoring; and (iii) board independence is negatively related to the manager's influence and positively related to constraints on that influence. These results indicate that economic considerations—in particular, the specific nature of the firm's competitive environment and managerial team—help explain cross-sectional variation in corporate board size and composition. Nonetheless, much of the variation in board structures remains unexplained, suggesting that idiosyncratic factors affect many individual boards’ characteristics.

This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making portfolio allocation decisions.

Equity prices are driven by shocks with persistence levels ranging from intraday horizons to several decades. To accommodate this diversity, we introduce a parsimonious equilibrium model with regime shifts of heterogeneous durations in fundamentals, and estimate specifications with up to 256 states on daily aggregate returns. The multifrequency equilibrium has higher likelihood than the Campbell and Hentschel [1992. No news is good news: an asymmetric model of changing volatility in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 31, 281–318] specification, while producing volatility feedback 10 to 40 times larger. Furthermore, Bayesian learning about volatility generates a novel trade-off between skewness and kurtosis as information quality varies, complementing the uncertainty channel [e.g., Veronesi, 1999. Stock market overreaction to bad news in good times: a rational expectations equilibrium model. Review of Financial Studies 12, 975–1007]. Economies with intermediate information best match daily returns.

It is well known that corporations issue foreign currency-denominated debt to hedge foreign currency cash flows with offsetting interest payments. We test an alternative “opportunistic” motive for foreign currency-denominated borrowing. We do so by constructing a comprehensive sample of foreign currency-denominated bonds issued by sovereign government and agency issuers with no foreign currency cash flows or foreign operations. We find strong and consistent evidence that the borrowers in our sample consider cross-currency differences in covered and uncovered interest yields in choosing the currency in which to denominate their international debt. We estimate the average gains to opportunistic covered yield borrowing to be 4 to 18 basis points. Interestingly, we also find that the average bond offering in our sample precedes a large and beneficial depreciation of the issue currency over the course of the following year. These results support what has been a frequent conjecture in the foreign debt market.

This paper provides an in-depth study of the allocation of a firm's residual risks not explicitly managed through interlocking contracts in the context of project finance. Focusing on the Ras Gas project, we relate its credit spreads as a measure of investor risk perceptions to firm-specific risk factors in the context of 25-year supply agreements, debt covenants, and a debt-service guarantee contingent on output prices. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that unmanaged risk factors affecting the supply agreement drive Ras Gas’ credit spreads, whereas managed ones have no effect. Interpreting our findings as evidence for the nexus-of-contracts view of the firm, we discuss some implications for financial design and valuation.

We analyze the impact of both purchasing power parity (PPP) deviations and market segmentation on asset pricing and investor's portfolio holdings. The freely traded securities command a world market risk premium and an inflation risk premium. The securities that can be held by only a subset of investors command two additional premiums: a conditional market risk premium and a segflation risk premium. Our model is empirically supported with important implications for tests of international asset pricing.

We investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors based on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits. Following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but experience a significant decline in other board seats held. This decline in other directorships is greater for more severe allegations of fraud and when the outside director bears greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Interlocked firms that share directors with the sued firm also exhibit valuation declines at the lawsuit filing. Fraud-affiliated directors are more likely to lose directorships at firms with stronger corporate governance and their departure is associated with valuation increases for these firms.

Previous research finds insignificant market-timing ability for mutual funds using tests based on fund returns. The return-based tests, however, are subject to the “artificial timing” bias. In this paper, we propose and implement new measures of market timing based on mutual fund holdings. Our holdings-based measures do not suffer from the artificial timing bias. We find that, on average, actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds have positive timing ability. Market timing funds use non-public information to predict market returns, tend to have high industry concentration, large fund size, a tilt toward small-cap stocks, and are active in industry rotation.

I examine the effects of bank relationships on underwriter choice in the Japanese corporate bond market following the 1993 deregulation. Bank relationships have significant positive effects on a firm's underwriter choice. Relationship firms receive a small but significant fee discount and, consistent with the mitigating effect of competition on hold-up costs, multiple-relationship firms receive a significantly deeper discount than single-relationship firms. Bank shareholding alone negatively affects underwriter choice, whereas shareholding together with loans has significantly more positive effects than loans alone. Finally, existing relationships reduce a Japanese firm's switching probability by 32%, in contrast to only 6% for U.S. firms.