Knowledge that Transforms

In the presence of jump risk, expected stock return is a function of the average jump size, which can be proxied by the slope of option implied volatility smile. This implies a negative predictive relation between the slope of implied volatility smile and stock return. For more than four thousand stocks ranked by slope during 1996–2005, the difference between the risk-adjusted average returns of the lowest and highest quintile portfolios is 1.9% per month. Although both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of slope are priced, the idiosyncratic component dominates the systematic component in explaining the return predictability of slope. The findings are robust after controlling for stock characteristics such as size, book-to-market, leverage, volatility, skewness, and volume. Furthermore, the results cannot be explained by alternative measures of steepness of implied volatility smile in previous studies.

In the G7 countries, the short-horizon performance of aggregate return predictors such as the dividend yield and the short rate appears non-existent during business cycle expansions but sizable during contractions. This phenomenon appears related to countercyclical risk premiums as well as the time-variation in the dynamics of predictors. Our empirical model outperforms the historical average out-of-sample in the US, but the results throughout the G7 are mixed.

Horizontal mergers exert price pressure on dependent suppliers and adversely affect their performance. Consistent with the theory of countervailing power, concentrated suppliers and those with greater barriers to entry experience larger price declines after consolidation downstream. Time-series results suggest that consolidation in dependent supplier industries follows mergers in main customer industries, indicating that consolidation activity travels up the supply chain. The findings are broadly consistent with pervasive beliefs in the business community about the buying power effects of horizontal mergers.

This paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio. The contract parameters, the extent of delegation, and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider. Symmetric (fulcrum) performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the Sharpe ratios. Asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and Sharpe ratios, with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds' excess performance.

We study the relation between access to finance and productivity. Our contribution to the literature is a clean identification of a causal effect of access to finance on productivity. Specifically, we exploit an exogenous shift in demand for a product to expose how producers adapt their productivity in the presence of varying levels of access to finance. We use a triple differences testing approach and find that production increases the most over the sample period in areas with relatively strong access to finance, even in comparison with a control group. This result is statistically significant and robust to a variety of controls, alternative variables, and tests. The causal effect of access to finance on productivity that we find speaks to the larger role of finance in economic growth.

We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.

Accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) are credible commitments by firms to repurchase shares immediately. Including an ASR in a repurchase program reduces the flexibility that firms have to alter an announced program in response to subsequent changes in the price and liquidity of its shares, unexpected shocks to cash flow and/or investment, etc. Thus, we investigate whether firms' decisions to include ASRs in their repurchase programs are associated with factors expected to influence the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of enhanced credibility and immediacy. We find robust evidence consistent with the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of credibility and immediacy being important determinants of ASR adoption. Additionally, we find that ASR announcements are associated with positive average abnormal stock returns.

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.

We study the effects of securitization on renegotiation of distressed residential mortgages over the current financial crisis. Unlike prior studies, we employ unique data that directly observe lender renegotiation actions and cover more than 60% of the U.S. mortgage market. Exploiting within-servicer variation in these data, we find that bank-held loans are 26–36% more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages (4.2–5.7% in absolute terms). Also, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient: conditional on a modification, bank-held loans have 9% lower post-modification default rates (3.5% in absolute terms). Our findings support the view that frictions introduced by securitization create a significant challenge to effective renegotiation of residential loans. We also provide evidence supporting the affordability focus of recent policy actions, such as the Home Affordability Modification Program.

We show theoretically that optimism can lead a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to choose the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholder value. Optimism below (above) the interior optimum leads the CEO to underinvest (overinvest). Hence, if boards of directors act in the interests of shareholders, CEOs with relatively low or high optimism face a higher probability of forced turnover than moderately optimistic CEOs face. Using a large sample of turnovers, we find strong empirical support for this prediction. The results are consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial optimism that maximizes firm value.