Knowledge that Transforms

We find evidence of widespread stale pricing in bond mutual funds and the resulting risks of dilution and fragility. A principal driver of this phenomenon is the high illiquidity of funds’ holdings, which makes accurate pricing difficult and provides funds with greater discretion over valuation. Consequently, net asset values (NAVs) are extremely stale and fund returns are predictable over several days and weeks, particularly during market crises. Opportunistic traders withdraw capital from overvalued funds, exacerbating the risk of fund runs, while buy-and-hold investors face annual dilution of around $1.2 billion. Our results highlight adverse consequences of insufficient fair valuation practices that remain pervasive even after corrective regulations that followed the 2003 market-timing scandal.

We apply a new methodology for identifying pervasive and discrete changes (“breaks”) in cross-sectional risk premia. Size, value, and investment risk premia have fallen off to the point where they are insignificantly different from zero at the end of the sample period. The market risk premium has also declined systematically over time but remains significant and positive as do the momentum and profitability risk premium. We construct a new instability risk factor from cross-sectional differences in individual stocks’ exposure to time-varying risk premia and show that this factor earns a premium comparable to that of commonly used risk factors.

We document that localized policies aimed at mitigating climate risk can have unintended consequences due to regulatory arbitrage by firms. Using a difference-in-differences framework to study the impact of the California cap-and-trade program with U.S. plant-level data, we show that financially constrained firms shift emissions and output from California to other states where they have similar plants that are underutilized. By contrast, unconstrained firms do not make such adjustments. Overall, unconstrained firms do not reduce their total emissions, whereas constrained firms increase their total emissions after the cap-and-trade rule, undermining the effectiveness of the policy.

We study the liquidity of the global currency market by analyzing the price impact of trading volume. We analyze a decade of CLS intraday data representative of global foreign exchange (FX) trading by developing a refinement of the popular Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure that we call realized Amihud, which is the ratio between realized volatility and trading volume. Inversely related to market depth, price impact increases with transaction costs, money market stress, uncertainty, and risk aversion. Furthermore, we analyze whether and how liquidity begets price efficiency by looking at violations of the “triangular” no-arbitrage condition. We find that dollar-based currencies offer a lower trading impact supporting price efficiency.

We study how non-financial multinational companies propagate economic declines from their subsidiaries located in countries experiencing an economic downturn to subsidiaries in countries not experiencing one. We find that investment is 18% lower in subsidiaries of these parents relative to the same-industry, same-country subsidiaries of parents that are headquartered in the same parent country but do not have a subsidiary in a country experiencing an economic downturn. The employment growth rate in the affected subsidiaries is zero or negative while it is 1.4% in the subsidiaries of unaffected parents. The aggregate industry-level sales and employment are also negatively impacted in the countries of the affected subsidiaries.

This paper analyzes the asset pricing and portfolio implications of an important barrier to sustainable investing: uncertainty about the corporate ESG profile. In equilibrium, the market premium increases and demand for stocks declines under ESG uncertainty. In addition, the CAPM alpha and effective beta both rise with ESG uncertainty and the negative ESG-alpha relation weakens. Employing the standard deviation of ESG ratings from six major providers as a proxy for ESG uncertainty, we provide supporting evidence for the model predictions. Our findings help reconcile the mixed evidence on the cross-sectional ESG-alpha relation and suggest that ESG uncertainty affects the risk-return trade-off, social impact, and economic welfare.

Using previously unexplored custodial data, we examine alternative investment vehicles (AVs) in private equity (PE) funds over the last four decades. By 2017, AVs reached 40% of all PE commitments. Average AV performance matches the PE market, but underperforms the main funds of the partnerships sponsoring the AVs. Limited partners (LPs) with better past performance invest in AVs with better average performance, even after conditioning on the general partners’ (GPs’) past records. This result is largely driven by preferential access of top LPs to top AVs. Returns in PE increasingly depend on the match between GPs and LPs and both parties’ outside options.

We study the effects of the Liberty Bond drives of World War I on financial intermediation in the 1920s and beyond. Using panel data on US counties, and an instrument that captures differences in the approaches used to market the bonds, we find that higher Liberty Bond subscription rates led to an increase in investment banks and a contraction in commercial bank assets. We also find that in the late 1930s, individuals residing in states where Liberty Bond subscription rates had been higher were more likely to report owning stocks or bonds. Although they were conducted to support the American effort in World War I, these bond drives reshaped American finance.

We empirically examine the effects of index investing using predictions derived from a Grossman-Stiglitz framework. An exogenous increase in index investing leads to lower information production as measured by Google searches, EDGAR views, and analyst reports, yet price informativeness remains unchanged. These findings are consistent with an equilibrium in which investors choose to gather private information whenever it is profitable. As index investing increases, there are fewer privately-informed active investors (so overall information production drops), but the mix of investors adjusts until the returns to active investing are unchanged. As a result, passive investing does not undermine price efficiency.

Firm managers likely have more information than outsiders. If managers strategically conceal information, market uncertainty will increase. We develop a dynamic corporate disclosure model, estimating the model using the management earnings forecasts of US public companies. The model, based on the buildup of reputations by managers over time, matches key facts about forecast dynamics. We find that 80% of firms strategically manage information, that managers have superior information around half of the time, and that firms conceal information about 40% of the time. Concealment increases market uncertainty by just under 8%, a sizable information loss.