Knowledge that Transforms

We exploit the 2020 Treasury market shock to analyze how external and internal constraints impact arbitrageurs. Using regulatory filings, we find that hedge funds reduced arbitrage activities and increased cash holdings, despite stable credit and low contemporaneous redemptions. Creditors’ regulatory and liquidity constraints were not propagated to hedge funds through repo—Treasury arbitrageurs’ predominant financing source. Fund-creditor borrowing data reveal more regulated dealers provided, and more important clients received, disproportionately higher funding. Value-at-risk reported by funds suggests internal risk constraints were binding. Our results support theoretical predictions that arbitrageur risk constraints and precautionary liquidity management can amplify market instability even when contemporaneous financing remains resilient.

We document that the reallocation of central bank reserves towards banks with higher liquidity needs fosters credit supply. Exploiting the ECB's tiered reserve remuneration system for identification, we show that this system encouraged banks with low reserve holdings to obtain more reserves through the money market. Concomitantly, these banks reduced their securities holdings and extended more credit. We estimate that the reallocation of one euro of reserves towards banks with ex ante low reserve holdings resulted in an increase in credit supply of about 15 cents.

The transition from London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) affects the reference rate of floating-rate debt worth trillions of dollars. We provide the first evidence highlighting a benefit of the benchmark transition for debt markets. Focusing on the market for dollar-denominated floating rate notes (FRNs), we compare the yield spreads of FRNs linked to LIBOR and SOFR, issued by the same entity during the same month. After adjusting for the maturity-matched spreads from derivatives markets, we find significantly lower spreads for SOFR-linked FRNs. We link this SOFR discount to the enhanced price stability of SOFR-linked FRNs.

We study the equilibrium effects of the “S” dimension of ESG under imperfect competition. ESG policies are pledges made by firms that constrain managers to treat their stakeholders better than market conditions alone dictate. Moderate policies limit market power and prompt managers to be more competitive; aggressive polices backfire, both for adopting firms and intended beneficiaries. In contrast to the “shareholder primacy” paradigm, competition in ESG policies under the “stakeholder capitalism” paradigm is a panacea for market power, delivering the first-best outcome in equilibrium. We discuss drivers behind the recent rise in ESG, ESG-linked compensation, and disclosure practices.

We study block trades in the corporate bond market, where dealers buy or sell blocks from initiating customers and offset their positions with receiving investors. Our findings indicate that while receivers benefit from trading cost savings, they primarily bear adverse selection costs and experience worse outcomes when informed trading is prevalent. Mandatory trade reporting improves receiver outcomes by revealing dealers’ private information, but the benefits are reduced when reporting is delayed. Our results emphasize the importance of transparency regime design and suggest potential market fragility: if information asymmetry becomes severe, receivers may withdraw from the block market.

Administrative earnings data reveal that households are exposed to large, countercyclical idiosyncratic tail risks in labor earnings. I illustrate how these risks affect asset prices within an asset pricing framework with recursive preferences, heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. Quantitatively, a model in which agents face a time-varying probability of experiencing a rare, idiosyncratic disaster, with parameters disciplined by data, matches the level and dynamics of the equity premium. Stock returns are highly informative about labor market event risk, and, consistent with model predictions, initial claims for unemployment, a proxy for labor market uncertainty, is a highly robust predictor of returns.

Do banks extending government-guaranteed loans simultaneously reduce their risk exposure to firms? Using unique euro-area credit register data and the COVID-19 guarantee programs as a laboratory, we find that 1 euro of guaranteed lending was associated with a reduction of 28 cents in non-guaranteed credit, relative to other banks lending to the same firm. Substitution was highest for riskier and smaller firms in more affected sectors and for stronger banks. Nevertheless, banks offered cheaper credit and longer maturities to guaranteed loan recipients, especially more fragile ones. This improvement in lending terms is the flipside of credit substitution.

We study the socially optimal level of illiquidity in an economy populated by households with taste shocks and present bias with naive beliefs. The government chooses mandatory contributions to accounts, each with a different pre-retirement withdrawal penalty. Collected penalties are rebated lump sum. When households have homogeneous present bias, β, the social optimum is well approximated by a single account with an early-withdrawal penalty of 1−β. When households have heterogeneous present bias, the social optimum is well approximated by a two-account system: (i) an account that is completely liquid and (ii) an account that is completely illiquid until retirement.

We analyze interactions between fiscal and monetary stimulus in a new Keynesian model with nominal mortgage debt that can be inflated away. Redistributive transfers are most impactful when followed by a temporary deviation from inflation-targeting monetary policy. Unlike other fiscal policies, redistribution causes inflation even in the absence of long-run debt sustainability problems, and inflating away mortgages results in additional redistribution. In a quantitative model with mortgage refinancing frictions, transfer payments provide much more stimulus than the redistributive effects of inflation. Borrowers gradually refinance after their mortgages are inflated away, dampening their immediate consumption response and reducing their long-run labor supply.

The analysis of corporate governance begins with a central feature of modern capitalism – the separation of ownership and control in large corporations – first empirically documented by Berle and Means (1932). Such separation entails several agency problems reflecting conflicts between managers and shareholders, such as self-dealing by managers, low effort, consumption of perquisites, and excessive growth and diversification. Berle and Means saw self-dealing as the central agency problem and stressed the law as the fundamental mechanism of addressing it. Jensen and Meckling (1976) considered the consumption of perquisites and emphasized private mechanisms, such as financial incentives for managers, to counter wasteful perks. Jensen (1986) instead focused on excessive growth and diversification, which led him to count on leverage and takeovers. The combination of public corporate governance mechanisms, mostly the law, and market governance shaped both theory and practice.