We investigate the relation between Tobin's Q and the structure of equity ownership for a sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 firms for 1986. We find a significant curvilinear relation between Q and the fraction of common stock owned by corporate insiders. The curve slopes upward until insider ownership reaches approximately 40% to 50% and then slopes slightly downward. We also find a significant positive relation between Q and the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that corporate value is a function of the structure of equity ownership.

Research suggests that leveraged buyouts create value through significant operating performance improvements. There is little evidence that buyouts lead to widespread employee layoffs, wage reductions, or wealth transfers from bondholders. LBOs continue to be controversial, however. Future research should focus on the effect of buyouts on firms' strategic investments, buyout firms' performance under difficult economic conditions, and the frequency and costs of financial distress associated with buyouts. Research can also focus on improving the performance of public corporations by examining the individual contributions of debt, management ownership, and corporate governance changes to podt-buyout performance.

A portfolio formed from a given list of assets is defined as a numeraire portfolio for the list if (a) it is self-financing, (b) its value is always positive, and (c) zero is always the best conditional forecast of the numeraire-dominated rate of return of every asset on the list. The numeraire portfolio exists if and only if there are no profit opportunities from trading assets on the list. For a sample list of heterogeneous assets (NYSE size-quintile portfolios, corporate bonds, and short-term bills), numeraire-dominated returns are similar to market-model forecast errors and, as abnormal return measures, clearly dominate market-adjusted returns.

We examine an exhaustive set of initial public offerings (IPOs) by venture-capital-backed companies between 1978 and 1987. We find that venture capitalists specialize their investments in firms to provide intensive monitoring services. Consistent with their monitoring role, the venture capitalists take concentrated equity positions, maintain their investment beyond the IPO, and serve on the boards of their portfolio firms. The quality of their monitoring services appears to be recognized by capital markets through lower underpricing for IPOs with better monitors.

Management plays a dominant role in selecting outside directors, inviting skepticism about outsiders' ability to make independent judgments on firm performance. Our examination of wealth effects surrounding outside director appointments finds significantly positive share-price reactions. We find no clear evidence that outside directors of any particular occupation are more or less valuable than others. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that outside directors are chosen in the interest of shareholders.

This paper examines financial distress and its effect on organizational efficiency. Imperfect information and conflicts of interest among the firm's claimholders influence the outcome of financial distress. Methods for resolving distress and controlling conflicts of interest are discussed. New evidence on financial restructuring and distress costs is presented along with evidence on the organizational restructuring that accompanies financial distress. The evidence demonstrates that financial distress has benefits as well as costs, and that financial and ownership structure affect the net costs

We investigate the effects of leveraged buyouts on total factor productivity (TFP) and related variables using a longitudinal database including over 12,000 manufacturing plants. LBOs (particularly MBOs) that occured during 1983–1986 had a strong positive effect on TFP in the first three post-buyout years: plant productivity increased from 2.0% above industry mean in the three pre-buyout years to 8.3% above industry mean in the three post-buyout years. However, 1981 and 1982 buyouts had no significant productivity effect. The employment and compensation of white-collar workers decline following buyouts, but those of blue-collar workers are unchanged.

We show that bid-ask errors in transaction prices are the predominant source of apparent price reversals in the short run for NASDAQ firms. Once we extract measurement errors in prices caused by the bid-ask spread, we find little evidence of market overreaction. On the contrary, we find that security returns are positively, and not negatively, autocorrelated. We also show that bid-ask errors lead to substantial spurious volatility in transaction returns; about half of measured daily return variances can be induced by the bid-ask effect.

The paper investigates how quickly prices attain new equilibrium levels after large-block transactions, and measures the associated temporary and permanent price effects. We find that prices adjust within at most three trades, with most of the adjustment occurring in the first trade. The temporary price effect for seller-initiated transactions is related to block size, but the temporary price effect observed for buyer-initiated transactions is no larger than that observed in 100 share trades. Most of the price effect associated with block trades is permanent and is related to block size, regardless of the initiating party

We examine the importance of dividend-capture trading in NASDAQ stocks by testing for cross-sectional relations between ex-day abnormal returns and bid-ask spreads. Throughout, we find that ex-day returns and spreads are positively related. The relation increases across dividend-yield quintiles and is strongest in high-yield stocks. The relation does not appear in a sample of non-ex-dividend days. These findings indicate that dividend-capture trading affects the ex-day returns of at least some, particularly high-yield, NASDAQ stocks, and that dividend-capture trading is important for understanding ex-dividend-day returns.