How costly is the poor governance of market intermediaries? Using unique trade level data from the stock market in Pakistan, we find that when brokers trade on their own behalf, they earn annual rates of return that are 50-90 percentage points higher than those earned by outside investors. Neither market timing nor liquidity provision by brokers can explain this profitability differential. Instead we find compelling evidence for a specific trade-based “pump and dump” price manipulation scheme: When prices are low, colluding brokers trade amongst themselves to artificially raise prices and attract positive-feedback traders. Once prices have risen, the former exit leaving the latter to suffer the ensuing price fall. Conservative estimates suggest these manipulation rents can account for almost a half of total broker earnings. These large rents may explain why market reforms are hard to implement and emerging equity markets often remain marginal with few outsiders investing and little capital raised.

This paper examines the competitive effects of commercial bank entry into the corporate debt underwriting market, particularly with respect to underwriter spreads, ex-ante yields, and market concentration. We find that underwriter spreads and ex-ante yields have declined significantly with bank entry, consistent with the market becoming more competitive. This effect is strongest among the lower-rated and smaller debt issues of which banks have underwritten a relatively greater share. The early evidence also indicates that bank entry has tended to decrease market concentration. Overall, our results suggest that bank entry has had a pro-competitive effect.

This paper hypothesizes that the risk per unit of time and the required rate of return are higher than normal during an event period whose timing can be predicted. Consistent with this hypothesis this paper presents empirical evidence indicating that the unconditional mean rate of return, the variance of stock returns and their systematic risk are higher than ‘usual’ during dividend announcement periods. However, the documented increases in the systematic risk are not large enough to fully explain the ‘excess returns’. This finding is puzzling and hard to reconcile with existing theory.

This paper examines the relation between the variance of equity returns and several explanatory variables. It is found that equity variances have a strong positive association with both financial leverage and, contrary to the predictions of the options literature, interest rates. To a substantial degree, the negative elasticity of variance with respect to value of equity that is part of market folklore is found to be attributable to financial leverage. A maximum likehood estimator is developed for this elasticity that is substantially more efficient than extant estimation procedures.

The level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news about the CEO's ability. The average CEO captures approximately half of the surpluses from good news, implying CEOs and shareholders have roughly equal bargaining power. In contrast, the average CEO bears none of the negative surplus from bad news, implying CEOs have downward rigid pay. These estimates are consistent with the optimal contracting benchmark of Harris and Hölmstrom (1982) and do not appear to be driven by weak governance. Risk-averse CEOs accept significantly lower compensation in return for the insurance provided by downward rigid pay.

I conduct an empirical investigation into the pricing of subprime asset-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and their contagion effects on other markets. Using data for the ABX subprime indexes, I find strong evidence of contagion in the financial markets. The results support the hypothesis that financial contagion was propagated primarily through liquidity and risk-premium channels, rather than through a correlated-information channel. Surprisingly, ABX index returns forecast stock returns and Treasury and corporate bond yield changes by as much as three weeks ahead during the subprime crisis. This challenges the popular view that the market prices of these “toxic assets” were unreliable; the results suggest that significant price discovery did in fact occur in the subprime market during the crisis.

Almost one-third of actively managed, diversified U.S. equity mutual funds specify a size and value/growth benchmark index in the fund prospectus that does not match the fund's actual style. Nevertheless, these “mismatched” benchmarks matter to fund investors. Performance relative to the specified benchmark is a significant determinant of a fund's subsequent cash inflows, even controlling for performance measures that better capture the fund's style. These incremental flows appear unlikely to be rational responses to abnormal returns. The evidence is consistent with the notion that mismatched self-designated benchmarks result from strategic fund behavior driven by the incentive to improve flows.

Existing empirical studies provide little support for the theoretical prediction that market makers rebalance their inventory through revisions of quoted prices. This study provides evidence that the NYSE's specialist does engage in significant inventory rebalancing, but only when not constrained by the affirmative obligation to provide liquidity imposed by the Price Continuity rule. The evidence also suggests that such obligations are associated with better market quality, but impose significant costs on the specialist. The specialist mitigates these costs through discretionary trading when the rule is not binding. These findings shed light on how exchange rules affect market makers’ behavior and market quality.

This paper examines the market for catastrophe event risk – i.e., financial claims that are linked to losses associated with natural hazards, such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Risk management theory suggests protection by insurers and other corporations against the largest cat events is most valuable. However, most insurers purchase relatively little cat reinsurance against large events, and premiums are high relative to expected losses. To understand why the theory fails, we examine transactions that look to capital markets, rather than traditional reinsurance markets, for risk-bearing capacity. We develop eight theoretical explanations and find the most compelling to be supply restrictions associated with capital market imperfections and market power exerted by traditional reinsurers.

Empirical researchers have frequently rejected the expectations hypothesis. The expectations hypothesis, however, has seldom, if ever, been tested at the extreme short end of the term structure where maturities are measured in days or weeks. Using overnight, weekly, and monthly repo rates, I find that term rates are almost unbiased estimates of the average overnight rate. This evidence provides new support for the expectations hypothesis.