Ties between similar partners in economic and financial networks are often attributed to concerns about agency costs. In this paper, we distinguish the underlying motives for tie formation between sets of potential partners in the network, thus informing the relative importance of agency cost and resource accumulation in tie formation across firms. We develop a robust and generalizable methodology that allows for the inference of similarity and/or cumulative advantage motives in the potential presence of resource trading. We estimate the model using venture capital (VC) co-investment networks, employing factor analysis to characterize orthogonal, interpretable resources for VC firms. In the VC setting, value-added resources other than capital appear to be exchanged for capital, but not for one another. We find little evidence for similarity motives as the primary driver of matching, suggesting that concerns over agency conflicts in partnering are dominated by the desire to accumulate higher levels of certain resources.

We document significant reductions in corporate payouts-both dividends and (to a larger extent) share repurchases-during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Payout reductions are more likely in firms with higher leverage, more valuable growth options, and lower cash balances, i.e., those more susceptible to the negative consequences of an external financing shock. Moreover, firms appear to use the proceeds from the reduction in payout to maintain cash levels and to fund investment. These findings are consistent with the view that a shock to the supply of credit (net of demand effects) during the financial crisis increased the marginal benefit of cash retention, leading some firms to turn to payout reductions as a substitute form of financing.

We present a theory of risk capital and of how tax and other costs of risk capital should be allocated in a financial firm. Risk capital is equity investment that backs obligations to creditors and other liability holders and maintains the firm׳s credit quality. Credit quality is measured by the ratio of the value of the firm׳s option to default to the default-free value of its liabilities. Marginal default values provide a full and unique allocation of risk capital. Efficient capital allocations maintain credit quality and preclude risk shifting. Our theory leads to an adjusted present value (APV) criterion for making investment and contracting decisions. We set out implications for risk management and corporate finance.

We empirically analyze the nature of returns to scale in active mutual fund management. We find strong evidence of decreasing returns at the industry level. As the size of the active mutual fund industry increases, a fund׳s ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines. At the fund level, all methods considered indicate decreasing returns, though estimates that avoid econometric biases are insignificant. We also find that the active management industry has become more skilled over time. This upward trend in skill coincides with industry growth, which precludes the skill improvement from boosting fund performance. Finally, we find that performance deteriorates over a typical fund׳s lifetime. This result can also be explained by industry-level decreasing returns to scale.

We propose a model to capture the dynamics of asset returns, with periods of crises that are characterized by contagion. In the model, a jump in one region of the world increases the intensity of jumps both in the same region (self-excitation) as well as in other regions (cross-excitation), generating episodes of highly clustered jumps across world markets that mimic the observed features of the data. We develop and implement moment-based estimation and testing procedures for this model. The estimates provide evidence of self-excitation both in the US and the other world markets, and of asymmetric cross-excitation, with the US market typically having more influence on the jump intensity of other markets than the reverse. We propose filtered values of the jump intensities as a measure of market stress and examine their out-of-sample forecasting abilities.

We study hedge funds that imposed discretionary liquidity restrictions (DLRs) on investor shares during the financial crisis. DLRs prolong fund life, but impose liquidity costs on investors, creating a potential conflict of interest. Ostensibly, funds establish DLRs to limit performance-driven withdrawals that could force fire sales of illiquid assets. However, after they restrict investor liquidity, DLR funds do not reduce illiquid stock sales and underperform a control sample of non-DLR funds. Consequently, DLRs appear to negatively impact fund family reputation. After the crisis, funds from DLR families faced difficulties raising capital and were more likely to cut their fees.