This paper tests models of mutual fund market timing that allow the manager's payoff function to depend on returns in excess of a benchmark, and distinguish timing based on publicly available information from timing based on finer information. We simultaneously estimate parameters which describe the public information environment, the manager's risk aversion, and the precision of the fund's market-timing signal. Using a sample of more than 400 U.S. mutual funds for 1976–94, our findings suggest that mutual funds behave as highly risk averse, benchmark investors. Conditioning on public information improves the model specification. After controlling for the public information, we find no evidence that funds have significant market-timing ability.

This paper tests traditional capital structure models against the alternative of a pecking order model of corporate financing. The basic pecking order model, which predicts external debt financing driven by the internal financial deficit, has much greater time-series explanatory power than a static tradeoff model, which predicts that each firm adjusts gradually toward an optimal debt ratio. We show that our tests have the power to reject the pecking order against alternative tradeoff hypotheses. The statistical power of some usual tests of the tradeoff model is virtually nil.

Economic volatility, high transaction costs, and fragile institutions hinder financial contracting in emerging markets. These conditions characterize the economy of Brazil, yet a nascent corporate bond market thrives. I analyze 50 Brazilian indenture agreements and find that sample debentures are characterized by (i)features that mitigate inflation risk for investors, (ii)contingent-maturity mechanisms that provide periodic opportunities for exit or renegotiation, (iii)a paucity of covenants that restrict the debtor's investment, financing, and dividend decisions, and (iv)self-enforcement mechanisms that avoid reliance on inefficient institutions. Analysis of these features enhances our understanding of contracting in emerging economies.

We examine whether an increase in focus is an explanation for the stock market gains associated with spinoffs. For a sample of 155 spinoffs between the years 1975 and 1991, we find that the announcement period as well the long-run abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spinoffs are significantly larger than the corresponding abnormal returns for the non-focus-increasing spinoffs. The results for the change in operating performance are consistent with those for the stock market performance. Cross-sectionally, the stock market performance as well as the operating performance are positively associated with change in focus. An analysis of the non-focus-increasing spinoffs shows that the firms are likely to undertake these spinoffs to separate underperforming subsidiaries from the parents.