We entertain the possibility of pervasive factors that are not common across two (or more) groups of securities. We propose and implement a general procedure to estimate the space spanned by common and group-specific pervasive factors. In our empirical analysis, we study the factor structure of excess returns on stocks traded on the NYSE and Nasdaq using our methodology. We find that there are only two common pervasive factors that govern the returns for both NYSE and Nasdaq. At the same time, the NYSE and Nasdaq each have one more group-specific factor that is not the same across the two exchanges. Our results point to the absence of complete similarity between the factors driving the returns on these exchanges.

We develop a model in which time-varying real investment opportunities lead to time-varying adverse selection in the market for IPOs. The model is consistent with several stylized facts known about the IPO market: economic expansions are associated with a dramatic increase in the number of firms going public, which is in turn positively correlated with underpricing. Adverse selection is procyclical in the sense that dispersion in unobservable quality across firms should be more pronounced during booms. Taking the premise that uncertainty is resolved (and thus private information revealed) over time, we test this hypothesis by looking at long-run abnormal returns and delisting rates. Consistent with the model, we find (a) greater cross-sectional return variance, and (b) higher incidence of delisting for hot-market IPOs.

We present a theory of capital investment and debt and equity financing in a real-options model of a public corporation. The theory assumes that managers maximize the present value of their future compensation (managerial rents), subject to constraints imposed by outside shareholders’ property rights to the firm's assets. Absent bankruptcy costs, managers follow an optimal debt policy that generates efficient investment and disinvestment. We show how bankruptcy costs can distort both investment and disinvestment. We also show how managers’ personal wealth constraints can lead to delayed investment and increased reliance on debt financing. Changes in cash flow can cause changes in investment by tightening or loosening the wealth constraints. Firms with weaker investor protection adopt higher debt levels.

We test the implications of a multi-asset equilibrium model in which a finite number of risk-averse liquidity providers accommodate non-informational trading imbalances. These imbalances generate predictable reversals in stock returns. An imbalance in one stock also affects the prices of other stocks. The magnitude of the cross-stock price pressure depends on the correlations of the stocks’ underlying cash flows. The model implies that non-informational trading increases the volatility of stock returns. We confirm the model's implications using data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange.

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and it is highest (lowest) when acquisitions by private bidders are compared to acquisitions by public companies with low (high) managerial ownership. Further, the premium paid by public bidders (not private bidders) increases with target managerial and institutional ownership.

This paper presents a new model for the valuation of European options, in which the volatility of returns consists of two components. One is a long-run component and can be modeled as fully persistent. The other is short-run and has a zero mean. Our model can be viewed as an affine version of Engle and Lee [1999. A permanent and transitory component model of stock return volatility. In: Engle, R., White, H. (Eds.), Cointegration, Causality, and Forecasting: A Festschrift in Honor of Clive W.J. Granger. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 475–497], allowing for easy valuation of European options. The model substantially outperforms a benchmark single-component volatility model that is well established in the literature, and it fits options better than a model that combines conditional heteroskedasticity and Poisson–normal jumps. The component model's superior performance is partly due to its improved ability to model the smirk and the path of spot volatility, but its most distinctive feature is its ability to model the volatility term structure. This feature enables the component model to jointly model long-maturity and short-maturity options.