Applying a “co-search” algorithm to Internet traffic at the SEC׳s EDGAR website, we develop a novel method for identifying economically related peer firms and for measuring their relative importance. Our results show that firms appearing in chronologically adjacent searches by the same individual (Search-Based Peers or SBPs) are fundamentally similar on multiple dimensions. In direct tests, SBPs dominate GICS6 industry peers in explaining cross-sectional variations in base firms׳ out-of-sample: (a) stock returns, (b) valuation multiples, (c) growth rates, (d) R&D expenditures, (e) leverage, and (f) profitability ratios. We show that SBPs are not constrained by standard industry classification, and are more dynamic, pliable, and concentrated. We also show that co-search intensity captures the degree of similarity between firms. Our results highlight the potential of the collective wisdom of investors — extracted from co-search patterns — in addressing long-standing benchmarking problems in finance.

Changes in monetary policy have surprisingly strong effects on forward real rates in the distant future. A 100 basis point increase in the two-year nominal yield on a Federal Open Markets Committee announcement day is associated with a 42 basis point increase in the ten-year forward real rate. This finding is at odds with standard macro-models based on sticky nominal prices, which imply that monetary policy cannot move real rates over a horizon longer than that over which all prices in the economy can readjust. Instead, the responsiveness of long-term real rates to monetary shocks appears to reflect changes in term premia. One mechanism that could generate such variation in term premia is based on demand effects due to the existence of what we call yield-oriented investors. We find some evidence supportive of this channel.

We present a theory of risk capital and of how tax and other costs of risk capital should be allocated in a financial firm. Risk capital is equity investment that backs obligations to creditors and other liability holders and maintains the firm׳s credit quality. Credit quality is measured by the ratio of the value of the firm׳s option to default to the default-free value of its liabilities. Marginal default values provide a full and unique allocation of risk capital. Efficient capital allocations maintain credit quality and preclude risk shifting. Our theory leads to an adjusted present value (APV) criterion for making investment and contracting decisions. We set out implications for risk management and corporate finance.

We provide evidence that some profitable insider stock selling is motivated by public information. At firms that disclose having concentrated sales relationships, insiders appear to sell their own stock profitably based on public information about their principal customers. Supplier insiders also sell more stock when public information about their customers׳ recent returns and earnings surprises suggests they will earn larger profits. These results are stronger when outside investor attention could be lower. Outside of this setting, insiders engage in a higher proportion of routine sales and their sales are less profitable. We do not find similar patterns for insider purchases.

We show that firms with Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) who personally benefit from options backdating are more likely to engage in other corporate misbehaviors, suggestive of an unethical corporate culture. These firms are more likely to commit financial fraud to overstate earnings. They acquire more private companies, which could perpetuate their frauds, and their acquisitions are met with lower market responses. These misbehaviors are concentrated in firms with externally hired suspect CEOs, consistent with outside CEOs having greater discretion to shape firm culture. The costs of these misbehaviors are reflected in larger stock price declines during a market correction and increased CEO replacement.

We provide a tractable model of firm-level expected holding period returns using two firm fundamentals—book-to-market ratio and return on equity—and study the cross-sectional properties of the model-implied expected returns. We find that firm-level expected returns and expected profitability are time-varying but highly persistent and that forecasts of holding period returns strongly predict the cross section of future returns up to three years ahead. We show a highly significant predictive pooled regression slope for future quarterly returns of 0.86. The popular factor-based expected return models have either an insignificant or a significantly negative association with future returns. In supplemental analyses, we show that these forecasts are also informative of the time series variation in aggregate conditions. For a representative firm, the slope of the conditional expected return curve is more positive in good times, when expected short-run returns are relatively low, and the model-implied forecaster of aggregate returns exhibits modest predictive ability. Collectively, we provide a simple, theoretically motivated, and practically useful approach to estimating multi-period-ahead expected returns.

Consistent with predictions from the psychology literature, we find that stock prices co-move more (less) in culturally tight (loose) and collectivistic (individualistic) countries. Culture influences stock price synchronicity by affecting correlations in investors׳ trading activities and a country׳s information environment. Both market-wide and firm-specific variations are lower in tighter cultures. Individualism is mostly associated with higher firm-specific variations. Trade and financial openness weakens the effect of domestic culture on stock price comovements. These results hold for various robustness checks. Our study suggests that culture is an important omitted variable in the literature that investigates cross-country differences in stock price comovements.

We propose and test an efficiency explanation for why firms deploy takeover defenses using initial public offering (IPO) firm data. We hypothesize that takeover defenses bond the firm׳s commitments by reducing the likelihood that an outside takeover will change the firm׳s operating strategy and impose costs on its business partners. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that IPO firms deploy more takeover defenses when they have important business relationships to protect. An IPO firm׳s use of takeover defenses is positively related to the longevity of its business relationships. IPO firms’ use of takeover defenses creates positive spillovers for their large customers. And IPO firms’ valuation and subsequent operating performance are positively related to their use of takeover defenses when they have important business relationships.

We examine the business model of traditional commercial banks when they compete with shadow banks. While both types of intermediaries create safe “money-like” claims, they go about this in different ways. Traditional banks create money-like claims by holding illiquid fixed-income assets to maturity, and they rely on deposit insurance and costly equity capital to support this strategy. This strategy allows bank depositors to remain “sleepy”: they do not have to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the market value of bank assets. In contrast, shadow banks create money-like claims by giving their investors an early exit option requiring the rapid liquidation of assets. Thus, traditional banks have a stable source of funding, while shadow banks are subject to runs and fire-sale losses. In equilibrium, traditional banks have a comparative advantage at holding fixed-income assets that have only modest fundamental risk but are illiquid and have substantial transitory price volatility, whereas shadow banks tend to hold relatively liquid assets.