In 2012, the US Department of Labor imposed new disclosure requirements for indirect fees that 401(k) retirement plan service providers earn through revenue sharing agreements with mutual funds. This paper examines the impact of these fee disclosure requirements on the level and structure of fees paid by retirement plans, as well as service providers’ ability to price discriminate between plan sponsors of different sophistication. We document that the new disclosure requirements are associated with a substitution of direct fees for indirect fees and a reduction in total fees paid by smaller plans, and that mutual fund providers responded by introducing retirement fund share classes with lower 12b-1 fees.

After decades of de-prioritizing shareholders’ economic interests and low corporate profitability, Japan introduced the JPX-Nikkei400 in 2014. The index highlighted the country’s “best-run” companies by annually selecting the 400 most profitable of its large and liquid firms. We find that managers competed for inclusion in the index by significantly increasing return on equity (ROE), and they did so at least in part due to their reputational or status concerns. The ROE increase was predominantly driven by improvements in margins, which were in turn partially driven by cutting research and development (R&D) intensity. Our findings suggest that indexes can affect managerial behavior through reputational or status incentives.

We examine the value and efficiency of analyst recommendations through the lens of capital market anomalies. We find that analysts do not fully use the information in anomaly signals when making recommendations. Analysts tend to give more favorable consensus recommendations to stocks classified as overvalued and, more important, these stocks subsequently tend to have particularly negative abnormal returns. Analysts whose recommendations are better aligned with anomaly signals are more skilled and elicit stronger recommendation announcement returns. Our findings suggest that analysts’ biased recommendations could be a source of market friction that impedes the efficient correction of mispricing.