Investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during the 2007–2009 credit crunch. If one believes that financial constraints have not disappeared, then investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. The decline and disappearance are robust to considerations of R&D and cash reserves, and across groups of firms. The information content in cash flow regarding investment opportunities has declined, but measurement error in Tobin's q does not completely explain the patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity. The decline and disappearance cannot be explained by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or market power—and remain a puzzle.

I show that as a portfolio’s value concentration increases, actively managed portfolios predictably trim large positions, maintaining a level of practical diversification. This rebalancing channel is concentrated at thresholds implied by regulatory guidelines and by a fund’s own risk management histories. Since larger stocks are typically held widely and in large weights, they experience a coordinated contrarian trading demand that originates from this form of risk management. Diversification driven demand captures a novel return-reversal pattern in the large stock portfolios. Compensating this source of demand accentuates momentum returns during the modern sample period (1990 to 2022).

This paper investigates how firms’ pollution incentives are influenced by their ability to divest polluted assets. My empirical setting is a major reform that exempts purchasers from liability for past contamination. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that the reform reduces toxic emissions, lowers bankruptcy risk, and increases firm value. Cross-sectional tests show that the decline in emissions is driven by firms with weaker financial health and fewer assets. These findings highlight a novel net worth channel: by limiting ex-post liability, the reform enhances landowners’ net worth ex-ante, reducing their incentives to engage in risky behavior, such as excessive emissions.

Time-to-build, time-to-produce, and inventory have important implications for asset prices and quantity dynamics in a general equilibrium model with recursive preferences. Time-to-build captures the delay in transforming new investments into productive capital, and time-to-produce captures the delay in transforming productive capital into output. Both delays increase risks in that time-to-build generates procyclical payouts, whereas the time-to-produce amplifies this procyclicality. Inventory smooths consumption and helps capture interest rate volatility even when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is small. The model is consistent with a high equity premium, a high stock return volatility, and lead-lag relations between asset prices and macroeconomic quantities.

A disconcerting, albeit generally accepted, finding is that aggregate stock returns are predictable by dividend yield but dividend growth is unpredictable. I show that part of this lack of dividend growth predictability stems from how dividend growth is constructed. I then show a dramatic reversal of predictability in the 134 years during 1872–2005: stock returns are largely unpredictable in the first seven decades, but become predictable in the postwar period; dividend growth is strongly predictable in the prewar years but this predictability disappears in the postwar years. New evidence on the predictability of long-run returns and dividend growth is also shown.

I argue that the reason the book-to-market effect is stronger in small stocks is because smaller stocks generally have shorter life expectancy and therefore shorter equity duration. I build a model in which the book-to-market effect is stronger in stocks with shorter life expectancy. Empirically, I use delisting probability as my proxy for life expectancy. The data support my model's central prediction and its additional implications for stock return and variance. My results provide a rational explanation for the heterogeneity of the book-to-market effect, evidence previously taken as support for behavioral explanations.

This study uses two distinct quasi-natural experiments to examine the effect of institutional shareholders on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We first find that an exogenous increase in institutional holding caused by Russell Index reconstitutions improves portfolio firms’ CSR performance. We then find that firms have lower CSR ratings when shareholders are distracted due to exogenous shocks. Moreover, the effect of institutional ownership is stronger in CSR categories that are financially material. Furthermore, we show that institutional shareholders influence CSR through CSR-related proposals. Overall, our results suggest that institutional shareholders can generate real social impact.

Building on two sources of exogenous shocks to analyst coverage (broker closures and mergers), we explore the causal effects of analyst coverage on mitigating managerial expropriation of outside shareholders. We find that as a firm experiences an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, shareholders value internal cash holdings less, its CEO receives higher excess compensation, its management is more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions, and its managers are more likely to engage in earnings management activities. Importantly, we find that most of these effects are mainly driven by the firms with smaller initial analyst coverage and less product market competition. We further find that after exogenous brokerage exits, a CEO׳s total and excess compensation become less sensitive to firm performance in firms with low initial analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, specifically that financial analysts play an important governance role in scrutinizing management behavior, and the market is pricing an increase in expected agency problems after the loss in analyst coverage.

Although firm-initiated clawbacks reduce accounting manipulation, they also induce managers to engage in suboptimal activities (e.g., reduce research and development (R&D) expenses) to achieve earnings targets. To assess the effectiveness of clawback provisions, we examine their impact from debtholders' point of view. We find that banks use more financial covenants and performance pricing provisions in the loan contracts and decrease interest rates after firms initiate clawbacks. Moreover, we also find that loan maturity increases and loan collateral decreases subsequent to clawback adoption. Taken together, our findings indicate that firm-initiated clawback provisions enhance financial reporting quality, thereby reducing the information uncertainty that financing providers face.