If short sellers can destroy firm value by manipulating prices down, an informed blockholder has a powerful natural incentive to protect the value of his stake by trading against them. However, he also has a potentially conflicting incentive to use his information to generate trading profits. We show that a speculator can exploit this conflict and force the blockholder to buy a disproportionately large amount to prevent value destruction. This is costly for the blockholder because the trades must sometimes be executed at inflated prices. Given reasonable constraints on short sellers, a sufficiently large blockholder will have the incentive to absorb these losses and prevent a bear raid. However, conditions exist under which outside intervention may be warranted.

We test the hypothesis that arbitrageurs amplify economic shocks in equity markets. The ability of speculators to hold short positions depends on asset values. Shorts are often reduced following good news about a stock. Therefore, the prices of highly shorted stocks are excessively sensitive to shocks compared with stocks with little short interest. We confirm this hypothesis using several empirical strategies including two quasi-experiments. In particular, we establish that the price of highly shorted stocks overshoots after good earnings news due to short covering compared with other stocks.

The paper analyzes the effect of competition between credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the information content of ratings. We show that a monopolistic CRA pools sellers into multiple rating classes and has partial market coverage. This provides an opportunity for market entry. The entrant designs a rating scale distinct from that of the incumbent. It targets higher-than-average companies in each rating grade of the incumbent's rating scale and employs more stringent rating standards. We use Standard and Poor's (S&P) entry into the market for insurance ratings previously covered by a monopolist, A.M. Best, to empirically test the impact of entry on the information content of ratings. The empirical analysis reveals that S&P required higher standards to assign a rating similar to the one assigned by A.M. Best and that higher-than-average quality insurers in each rating category of A.M. Best chose to receive a second rating from S&P.

This paper investigates whether the securitization of corporate bank loan facilities had an impact on the price of corporate debt. Our results suggest that loan facilities that are subsequently securitized are associated with a 17 basis point lower spread than that of facilities that are not subsequently securitized. We consider facility characteristics that are associated with the likelihood of securitization and estimate the extent to which these characteristics are related to spreads. We document that Term Loan B facilities, facilities of B-rated firms, and facilities originated by banks that originate CLOs are securitized more frequently than other facilities. Spreads on facilities estimated to be more likely to be subsequently securitized have lower spreads than otherwise similar facilities. The results are consistent with the view that securitization caused a reduction in the cost of capital.

The effectiveness of any sanction depends on the costs of avoiding its restrictions. We examine whether bearish option strategies were substitutes for short sales during the September 2008 short-sale ban. We find a significant diminution in option volumes and a significant increase in option bid-ask spreads for banned stock relative to unbanned stock during the ban period. Apparent violations of the put-call parity bound became significantly more frequent for banned stocks during the ban period. We conclude that the ban acted as an effective restriction on trading in options.

CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, and a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. Collectively, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky.