Exceptional accuracy and speed for option pricing are available via quadrature (Andricopoulos, Widdicks, Duck, and Newton, 2003), extending into multiple dimensions with complex path-dependency and early exercise (Andricopoulos, Widdicks, Newton, and Duck, 2007). However, the exposition is incomplete, leaving many modelling processes outside the Black-Scholes-Merton framework unattainable. We show how to remove the remaining major block to universal application. Although this had appeared highly problematic, the solution turns out to be conceptually simple and implementation is straightforward (we provide code on the Journal of Financial Economics website at http://jfe.rochester.edu). Crucially, the method retains its speed and flexibility across complex combinations of option features but is now applicable across other underlying processes.

We document issuance overpricing of corporate debt securities in China, which is robust across subsamples with different credit ratings, maturities, and issuers. This phenomenon contrasts with underpricing of equity and debt securities in Western countries and reflects China's distinct institutional environment. The average overpricing dropped from 7.44 basis points to 2.41 basis points after the government prohibited underwriters from using rebates in issuances in October 2017. By analyzing overpricing before and after the rebate ban and across different issuers and underwriters, we uncover two channels for underwriters, who compete for future underwriting business, to drive up overpricing: rebates and self-purchases.

We evaluate the connection between corporate characteristics and the reaction of stock returns to COVID-19 cases using data on more than 6,700 firms across 61 economies. The pandemic-induced drop in stock returns was milder among firms with stronger pre-2020 finances (more cash and undrawn credit, less total and short-term debt, and larger profits), less exposure to COVID-19 through global supply chains and customer locations, more corporate social responsibility activities, and less entrenched executives. Furthermore, the stock returns of firms controlled by families (especially through direct holdings and with non-family managers), large corporations, and governments performed better, and those with greater ownership by hedge funds and other asset management companies performed worse. Stock markets positively price small amounts of managerial ownership but negatively price high levels of managerial ownership during the pandemic.