In 1982, Dimensional Fund Advisors launched a mutual fund intended to capture the returns of small-cap stocks. The ‘9–10 Fund’ is based on the CRSP 9–10 Index, an index of small-cap stocks constituting the ninth and tenth deciles of NYSE market capitalization, although the 9–10 Fund incorporates investment rules and a trading strategy that are aimed at minimizing the potentially excessive trade costs associated with such illiquid stocks. As a result, the 9–10 Fund provided a 2.2% annual premium over the 9–10 Index for the 1982–1995 period. We show that both the investment rules and the trade strategy components of the Fund’s design contribute significantly to this return difference.

Returns computed with closing bid or ask prices that may not represent ‘true’ prices introduce measurement error into portfolio returns if investor buying and selling display systematic patterns. This paper finds systematic tendencies for closing prices to be recorded at the bid in December and at the ask in early January. After changing bid and ask prices are controlled for. this pattern results in large portfolio returns on the two trading days surrounding the end of the year, especially for low-price stocks. Other temporal return patterns (e.g. weekend and holiday effects) are also related to systematic trading patterns.

This study examines, month-by-month, the empirical relation between abnormal returns and market value of NYSE and AMEX common stocks. Evidence is provided that daily abnormal return distributions in January have large means relative to the remaining eleven months, and that the relation between abnormal returns and size is always negative and more pronounced in January than in any other month — even in years when, on average, large firms earn larger risk-adjusted returns than small firms. In particular, nearly fifty percent of the average magnitude of the ‘size effect’ over the period 1963–1979 is due to January abnormal returns. Further, more than fifty percent of the January premium is attributable to large abnormal returns during the first week of trading in the year, particularly on the first trading day.

Owners of capital frequently lack knowledge about investment opportunities. One alternative is to turn to a manager for assistance. The owner's problem of contracting for the services of a manager is treated as a problem in buying information. The surprising result is that it is sometimes possible to trade information even when the owner is unable to form his own assessment of the information's value. Under some conditions it is possible to write a managerial compensation contract which will induce the manager to act in the best interests of the owner. These conditions require owner knowledge of the manager's employment and investment alternatives and risk preferences as well as some, but not all, of the characteristics of the investment opportunities.

The Black-Scholes option pricing model, as generalized for dividend payments by Merton, is used to calculate implied variances of future stock returns. These variances are found to be better predictors of future stock return variances than those obtained from historic stock price data. A trading strategy is developed that exploits the informational content of the implied variances. The trading strategy, contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, produces abnormally high returns.

Event-study driven research has produced a consensus that loans are unique relative to other financial contracts. But these studies assume that small samples of loan announcements adequately represent the loan population. We find that loan announcements are rare and driven by factors such as information asymmetry and perceived materiality. We show that the sample used by Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) fails to represent the loan universe and that significant abnormal announcement returns are confined to their smallest firms. Our sample, which better represents the loan population, produces an abnormal return insignificantly different from zero. The findings suggest that self-selection bias affects extant loan announcement research and do not support the views that loans are a special form of finance or that private and public debt differ in significant ways. Were all loans to be announced, the average abnormal return would likely be insignificant.

Several predetermined variables that reflect levels of bond and stock prices appear to predict returns on common stocks of firms of various sizes, long-term bonds of various default risks, and default-free bonds of various maturities. The returns on small-firm stocks and low-grade bonds are more highly correlated in January than in the rest of the year with previous levels of asset prices, especially prices of small-firm stocks. Seasonality is found in several conditional risk measures, but such seasonality is unlikely to explain, and in some cases is opposite to, the seasonal found in mean returns.

This paper examines the magnitude and determinants of transactions costs for a sample of institutional traders with different investment styles. Using order-level data for recent equity transactions totaling $83 billion, we find that trading costs are economically significant and increase with trade difficulty. In addition, costs vary with traderspecific factors such as investment style and order submission strategy, as well as stock-specific factors such as exchange listing. We find evidence that institutional trades in exchange-listed stocks have lower costs than in comparable Nasdaq stocks.

This paper examines the behavior of institutional traders. We use unique data on the equity transactions of 21 institutions of differing investment styles which provide a detailed account of the anatomy of the trading process. The data include information on the number of days needed to fill an order and types of order placement strategies employed. We analyze the motivations for trade, the determinants of trade duration, and the choice of order type. The analysis provides some support for the predictions made by theoretical models, but suggests that these models fail to capture important dimensions of trading behavior.

This study investigates the returns to acquiring-firm stockholders in federally assisted mergers in the savings and loan industry. It is unique in that (a) these mergers are arranged and subsidized by government regulators and (b) they occur in a single industry, one plagued by well-publicized financial difficulties. The contribution of resources by the federal government creates the possibility of wealth transfers from the government to owners of the acquiring firms. We find, consistent with the oversubsidization hypothesis, that shareholders of acquiring firms earn significant positive returns.