I analyze market-order execution quality using order-based data reported in accordance with Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 11Ac1-5. These data facilitate a comprehensive investigation of multiple dimensions of execution quality, including measures of costs and speed, for large samples of common stocks on Nasdaq and the NYSE. The evidence is consistent with competitive equity markets. Overall execution costs on Nasdaq exceed those on the NYSE, but orders execute faster. This relationship reverses for larger orders exceeding 1,999 shares. The apparent trade-off between costs and speed suggests that inferring execution quality from costs alone could be problematical. It also illustrates the need for models of trader behavior that can accommodate multiple dimensions of execution quality.

Studies by Vermaelen (1981) and others indicate that the positive excess stock returns around self-tender offer announcements are the result of a signal of future earnings improvements. Comment and Jarrell (1991), Lee, Mikkelson and Partch (1992) and Persons (1994) argue that the signal in fixed-price self-tender offers should be stronger than the signal in Dutch auction self-tender offers. This study tests whether the earnings improvement following fixed-price self-tender offers is greater than that following Dutch auction self-tender offers. We find some evidence that earnings improve following both types of self-tender offers. However, we find no difference in earnings improvement between the two types of offers.

This paper provides a method for estimating the market risk premium that accounts for shifts in investment opportunities by explicitly modeling the underlying process governing the level of market volatility. I find that approximately 50% of the measured risk premium is related to the risk of future changes in investment opportunities. Evidence of a structural shift in the underlying volatility process suggests that the simple historical average of excess market returns may substantially overstate the magnitude of the market risk premium for the period since the Great Depression.

Recent studies argue that implicit collusion explains the tendency of Nasdaq market makers to avoid odd-eighth price quotes. This paper focuses on the role that preference trading plays in determining quoted spreads. Under the postulated effects of preference trading, an analysis of the relation between spreads and price fractions explains the paucity of odd-eighth quotes on Nasdaq. Empirical results from a comprehensive data set show that exogenous economic characteristics explain the distribution of price fractions across securities, and illustrate the stability of that distribution over time. These results contradict empirical results offered as support for the collusion hypothesis.

The information content of Value Line Investment Survey rank changes is investigated. The results suggest rank changes affect common stock prices, but the effect varies by the type of rank change. Changes from rank 2 to rank 1 have the most dramatic impact on prices. A cross-sectional analysis finds small firms have a greater reaction to a rank change than larger firms, which supports theories on the frequency of report arrival and precision of information. A speed of adjustment test concludes the prices of individual securities adjust to the information in a rank change over a multiple-day period.

Mayers and Rice conjecture that an investor with better information will on average plot above the security market line as drawn by uninformed investors. This paper demonstrates that this conjecture is false in general, by constructing a counterexample. However, the Mayers-Rice conjecture is really part of a much broader hypothesis concerning whether increases in expected returns correspond to increases in expected utilities. It is shown that this latter hypothesis is true when the investor has an exponential or logarithmic utility function.

This paper examines the pricing of convertible bonds and preferred stocks. The optimal policies for call and conversion of these securities are determined via the criterion of dominance. The techniques underlying the Black-Scholes Option Model are used to price convertible securities as contingent claims on the firm as a whole.

Using the option pricing methods developed by Black and Scholes as a general technique for contingent claims analysis, this paper examines a class of mutual funds known as Dual Purpose Funds. By constructing a simplified model for these funds under the ‘perfect hedge’ conditions of Black and Scholes, it is demonstrated that the asset value of the fund will always exceed the market value and that it is not inconsistent with market equilibrium or efficiency for the capital shares to sell at a discount. The simple model predicts price fluctuations in the seven dual funds studied quite well; however, there is a persistent downward bias in the predicted price level. Finally, refinements to the model are examined to determine the nature of the misspecification causing this bias.

Within the German corporate governance system, employee representation on the supervisory board is typically legally mandated. We propose that such representation of labor on corporate boards confers valuable first-hand operational knowledge to corporate board decision-making. Indeed, we find that labor representation provides a powerful means of monitoring and reduces agency costs within the firm. Moreover, we show that the greater the need for coordination within the firm, the greater the potential improvement there is in governance effectiveness through the judicious use of labor representation. These benefits do not appear to hold for union representatives.

The types of investments a firm undertakes will depend in part on what it expects the outcome of those investments to reveal about its skills, capabilities, and assets (i.e., its resources). We predict that a firm will specialize when young, then experiment in a new line of business for some time, and then either expand into a large, multisegment business or focus and scale up its specialized business. We derive several empirical implications for firm valuations and the reaction of stock prices to news about firm prospects. We also offer a novel explanation for the well-documented “diversification” discount.