If managers induce employees to hold company stock in defined contribution pension plans as a form of takeover defense, then changes in state laws that enhance managerial protection should lead to a reduction in employer stock in 401(k) plans. Delaware's mid-1990s validation of the poison pill in conjunction with a staggered board was followed by a significant decline in employee ownership within defined contribution plans for firms incorporated in Delaware. Evidence using governance data suggests that this is due to responses of firms with staggered boards. Binary choice models confirm that employee ownership in defined contribution plans lowers takeover probabilities.

This paper proposes a consumption-based model that accounts for many features of the nominal term structure of interest rates. The driving force behind the model is a time-varying price of risk generated by external habit. Nominal bonds depend on past consumption growth through habit and on expected inflation. When calibrated to data on consumption, inflation, and the aggregate market, the model produces realistic means and volatilities of bond yields and accounts for the expectations puzzle. The model also captures the high equity premium and excess stock market volatility.

We investigate an economy of heterogeneous agents that cannot specify all exogenous welfare-relevant events and consequently view the impact of unforeseen contingencies as utility shocks. In this setting we characterize an appropriate market equilibrium concept when securities can trade only on demand- and price-contingent events. We establish the existence of an equilibrium for a class of parametric models in which aggregating taste shocks across agents can lead to nonconsumption pricing factors. To fit the stylized facts, (i) non consumption factors must dominate the pricing kernel and contribute to the variation of the wealth-consumption ratio, (ii) markets must be incomplete and the set of claims that are traded endogenously determined, (iii) agents’ preferences with respect to unforeseen contingencies must be non-expected utility, and, (iv) although non-consumption pricing factors can be conditionally uncorrelated with aggregate consumption shocks, they must be correlated with shocks to expected consumption growth.

Recent studies suggest that the conditional CAPM holds, period by period, and that time-variation in risk and expected returns can explain why the unconditional CAPM fails. In contrast, we argue that variation in betas and the equity premium would have to be implausibly large to explain important asset-pricing anomalies like momentum and the value premium. We also provide a simple new test of the conditional CAPM using direct estimates of conditional alphas and betas from short-window regressions, avoiding the need to specify conditioning information. The tests show that the conditional CAPM performs nearly as poorly as the unconditional CAPM, consistent with our analytical results.

We examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns. These returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position. A unique Desperation Index is employed to determine the current status of a firm's internal productivity. We find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing-type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines.

The empirical literature provides conflicting assessments about how firms choose their capital structures. Distinguishing among the three main hypotheses (“tradeoff”, pecking order, and market timing) requires that we know whether firms have long-run leverage targets and (if so) how quickly they adjust toward them. Yet many previous researchers have applied empirical specifications that fail to recognize the potential for incomplete adjustment. A more general, partial-adjustment model of firm leverage indicates that firms do have target capital structures. The typical firm closes about one-third of the gap between its actual and its target debt ratios each year.

Conventional tests of the predictability of stock returns could be invalid, that is reject the null too frequently, when the predictor variable is persistent and its innovations are highly correlated with returns. We develop a pretest to determine whether the conventional t-test leads to invalid inference and an efficient test of predictability that corrects this problem. Although the conventional t-test is invalid for the dividend–price and smoothed earnings–price ratios, our test finds evidence for predictability. We also find evidence for predictability with the short rate and the long-short yield spread, for which the conventional t-test leads to valid inference.

We develop a model of a two-division firm in which the “strong” division has, on average, higher quality investment opportunities than the “weak” division. We show that, in the presence of agency and information problems, optimal effort incentives are less powerful and thus managerial effort is lower in the strong division. This leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division. The selection bias is more severe when there is a larger spread in the average quality of investment opportunities between the two divisions.

We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta.

Streetlore since at least 1973 has touted the market return in January as a predictor of market returns for the remainder of the year. We systematically examine the predictive power of January returns over the period 1940–2003 and find that January returns have predictive power for market returns over the next 11 months of the year. The effect persists after controlling for macroeconomic/business cycle variables that have been shown to predict stock returns, the Presidential Cycle in returns, and investor sentiment, and it persists among both large and small capitalization stocks and among both value and growth stocks. In addition, we find that January has predictive power for two of the three premiums in the Fama–French [1993. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–50] three-factor model of asset pricing.