The change in the cost of capital that results from a divestiture strategy can be closely approximated by a simple function of three parameters: (1) the fraction of socially conscious capital, (2) the fraction of targeted firms in the economy and (3) the return correlation between the targeted firms and the rest of the stock market. When calibrated to current data, we demonstrate that the impact on the cost of capital is too small to meaningfully affect real investment decisions. We then derive the conditions that would be required for the strategy to have a meaningful impact. We empirically corroborate our theoretical results by studying firm changes in ESG status and are unable to detect an impact of ESG divestiture strategies on the cost of capital of treated firms. Our results suggest that to have impact, instead of divesting, socially conscious investors should invest and exercise their rights of control to change corporate policy.

We propose a new method of testing asset pricing models that relies on quantities rather than just prices or returns. We use the capital flows into and out of mutual funds to infer which risk model investors use. We derive a simple test statistic that allows us to infer, from a set of candidate models, the risk model that is closest to the model that investors use in making their capital allocation decisions. Using our method, we assess the performance of the most commonly used asset pricing models in the literature.

Using the value that a mutual fund extracts from capital markets as the measure of skill, we find that the average mutual fund has used this skill to generate about $3.2 million per year. Large cross-sectional differences in skill persist for as long as ten years. Investors recognize this skill and reward it by investing more capital with better funds. Better funds earn higher aggregate fees, and a strong positive correlation exists between current compensation and future performance. The cross-sectional distribution of managerial skill is predominantly reflected in the cross-sectional distribution of fund size, not gross alpha.

We summarize and extend the new literature on the term structure of equity. Short-term equity claims, or dividend strips, have higher average returns and Sharpe ratios than the aggregate stock market. The returns on short-term dividend claims are risky as measured by volatility, but safe as measured by market beta. These facts are hard to reconcile with traditional macro-finance models and we provide an overview of new models that can reproduce some of these facts. We relate our evidence on dividend strips to facts about other asset classes such as nominal and corporate bonds, volatility, and housing. We discuss the broader economic implications of our findings by linking the term structure of returns to real economic decisions such as hiring and investment. We conclude with an outline of empirical and theoretical extensions that we consider interesting avenues for future research.

We estimate risk-free interest rates unaffected by convenience yields on safe assets. We infer them from risky asset prices without relying on any specific model of risk. We obtain interest rates and implied convenience yields with maturities up to three years at a minutely frequency. Our estimated convenience yield on Treasuries equals about 40 basis points, is larger below three months maturity, and quadruples during the financial crisis. In high-frequency event studies, conventional and unconventional monetary stimulus reduces our rates more than the corresponding Treasury yields, thus broadly affecting rates even outside the narrow confines of the fixed-income market.

We classify asset pricing anomalies into those exacerbating mispricing (build-up anomalies) and those resolving it (resolution anomalies). We estimate the dynamics of price wedges for well-known anomaly portfolios and map them to firm-level mispricings. We find that several prominent anomalies like momentum and profitability further dislocate prices. Multi-factor models designed to eliminate one-month alphas still produce large price wedges. Our estimates yield a novel decomposition of Tobin’s q, revealing that q’s mispricing component has substantial explanatory power for firm investment. Overall, our results suggest that financial intermediaries chasing build-up anomalies negatively affect price efficiency and associated real capital allocation.