Firms in global markets often belong to business groups. We argue that this feature can have a profound influence on international asset pricing. In bad times, business groups may strategically reallocate risk across affiliated firms to protect core “central firms.” This strategic behavior induces co-movement among central firms, creating a new intertemporal risk factor. Based on a novel data set of worldwide ownership for 2002–2012, we find that central firms are better protected in bad times and that they earn relatively lower expected returns. Moreover, a centrality factor augments traditional models in explaining the cross section of international stock returns.

We document aggregate outflows from corporate bond mutual funds days before and after the announcement of increases in the Federal Funds Target rate (FFTar). To rationalize this phenomenon, we build a model in which funds’ net-asset-values (NAVs) are stale and investors strategically redeem to profit from the mispricing when they learn about the increases of FFTar. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we find that stale NAVs and loose monetary policy environments weaken (strengthen) outflows sensitivity to increases in FFTar during illiquid (liquid) market conditions. Our results highlight when and how monetary policy could systematically exacerbate the fragility of corporate bond funds.