This paper investigates how firms’ pollution incentives are influenced by their ability to divest polluted assets. My empirical setting is a major reform that exempts purchasers from liability for past contamination. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that the reform reduces toxic emissions, lowers bankruptcy risk, and increases firm value. Cross-sectional tests show that the decline in emissions is driven by firms with weaker financial health and fewer assets. These findings highlight a novel net worth channel: by limiting ex-post liability, the reform enhances landowners’ net worth ex-ante, reducing their incentives to engage in risky behavior, such as excessive emissions.

I argue that the reason the book-to-market effect is stronger in small stocks is because smaller stocks generally have shorter life expectancy and therefore shorter equity duration. I build a model in which the book-to-market effect is stronger in stocks with shorter life expectancy. Empirically, I use delisting probability as my proxy for life expectancy. The data support my model's central prediction and its additional implications for stock return and variance. My results provide a rational explanation for the heterogeneity of the book-to-market effect, evidence previously taken as support for behavioral explanations.

Investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during the 2007–2009 credit crunch. If one believes that financial constraints have not disappeared, then investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. The decline and disappearance are robust to considerations of R&D and cash reserves, and across groups of firms. The information content in cash flow regarding investment opportunities has declined, but measurement error in Tobin's q does not completely explain the patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity. The decline and disappearance cannot be explained by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or market power—and remain a puzzle.