This paper analyzes the recommendations of common stocks made by the investment newsletters followed by the Hulbert Financial Digest. We conclude that, taken as a whole, the securities that newsletters recommend do not outperform appropriate benchmarks. Our data provide modest evidence that the future performance of a newsletter is related to its past performance, when performance is measure by raw returns. Evidence of persistence vanishes, however, when performance is measured by abnormal returns. We find little, if any, evidence of herding, i.e., cross-sectional dependence of recommendations, across newsletters. Newsletters tend to recommend securities that have performed well in the recent past. Finally, newsletters with poor past performance are more likely to go out of business.

This paper examines empirically whether the short-swing rule (Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act) deters managers from trading before mergers. Since a merger forces the sale of the target's outstanding equity, insider purchases within six months before the merger cannot escape this rule. We examine the 1941–1961 period when no other insider trading laws were enforced. Consistent with 16b's deterrent effect, managers' purchases drop significantly before the announcement. Before completion, the decrease occurs only in the 1941–1955 period. Surprisingly, pre-announcement sales do not decline, even though 16b cannot punish deferral of planned sales.