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Bankruptcy, absolute priority, and the pricing of risky debt claims

Journal of Financial Economics 1977 4(3), 239-276
In practice, there are substantial deviations from the doctrine of ‘absolute priority’, which governs the rights of the firm's claimholders in the event of bankruptcy. To determine whether or not the possibility of such deviations is reflected in the prices of the firm's securities, this study examines the risk and return characteristics of financial claims against firms in court-supervised bankruptcy proceedings. Debt claims against bankrupt firms are indeed ‘risky’, exhibiting levels of systematic risk similar to that of common stocks in general. While some of the findings are anomalous, the data are generally consistent with the view that the capital market ‘properly’ prices risky debt claims to reflect both their risk characteristics and the possibility of departures from the doctrine of absolute priority.

On corporate governance

Journal of Financial Economics 1983 11(1-4), 401-438
This paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors. Dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats. Nevertheless, they capture some seats, via mechanisms such as cumulative voting, in over half of the sample contests. Regardless of proxy contest outcome, positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest. That finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests, in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance. The finding runs counter to the claim of Berle (1962) that the economists' view of proxy contests is ‘a wholly imaginary picture’. A portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent, however, and as suggested by Manne (1962) is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares.

Aggregate price effects of institutional trading: a study of mutual fund flow and market returns

Journal of Financial Economics 2001 59(2), 195-220
We study the relation between market returns and aggregate flow into U.S. equity funds, using daily flow data. The concurrent daily relation is positive. Our tests show that this concurrent relation reflects flow and institutional trading affecting returns. This daily relation is similar in magnitude to the price impact reported for an individual institution's trades in a stock. Aggregate flow also follows market returns with a one-day lag. The lagged response of flow suggests either a common response of both returns and flow to new information, or positive feedback trading.

Measuring long-horizon security price performance

Journal of Financial Economics 1997 43(3), 301-339 open access
Our simulation results show that tests for long-horizon (i.e.. multi-year) abnormal security returns around firm-specific events are severely misspecified. The rejection frequencies using parametric tests sometimes exceed 30% when the significance level of the test is 5%. Our results are robust to many different abnormal-return models. Conclusions from long-horizon studies require extreme caution. Nonparametric and bootstrap tests are likely to reduce misspecification.

Stealth trading and volatility

Journal of Financial Economics 1993 34(3), 281-305 open access
We examine the proportion of a stock's cumulative price change that occurs in each trade-size category, using transactions data for a sample of NYSE firms. Although the majority of trades are small, most of the cumulative stock-price change is due to medium-size trades. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category, and that price movements are due mainly to informed traders' private information.

On financial contracting

Journal of Financial Economics 1979 7(2), 117-161
With risky debt outstanding, stockholder actions aimed at maximizing the value of their equity claim can result in a reduction in the value of both the firm and its outstanding bonds. We examine ways in which debt contracts are written to control the conflict between bondholders and stockholders. We find that extensive direct restrictions on production/investment policy would be expensive to employ and are not observed. However, dividend and financing policy restrictions are written to give stockholders incentives to follow a firm-value-maximizing production/investment policy. Taking into account how contracts control the bondholder- stockholder conflict leads to a number of testable propositions about the specific form of the debt contract that a firm will choose.

Stock returns, aggregate earnings surprises, and behavioral finance

Journal of Financial Economics 2006 79(3), 537-568
We study the stock market's reaction to aggregate earnings news. Prior research shows that, for individual firms, stock prices react positively to earnings news but require several quarters to fully reflect the information in earnings. We find a substantially different pattern in aggregate data. First, returns are unrelated to past earnings, suggesting that prices neither underreact nor overreact to aggregate earnings news. Second, aggregate returns correlate negatively with concurrent earnings; over the last 30 years, for example, stock prices increased 5.7% in quarters with negative earnings growth and only 2.1% otherwise. This finding suggests that earnings and discount rates move together over time and provides new evidence that discount-rate shocks explain a significant fraction of aggregate stock returns.

The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors

Journal of Financial Economics 1988 20, 3-24
This article surveys the seventeen papers in this special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics, and related work. The major findings are: (1) patterns of stock ownership by insiders and outsiders can influence managerial behavior, corporate performance, and stockholder voting in election contests; (2) corporate leverage, inside stock ownership by managers, and the control market are interrelated; (3) departures from one share/one vote affect firm value and efficiency; (4) takeover resistance through defensive restructurings or poison pill provisions is associated with declines in share price; and (5) top management turnover is inversely related to share price performance.

Using daily stock returns

Journal of Financial Economics 1985 14(1), 3-31
This paper examines properties of daily stock returns and how the particular characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies. Daily data generally present few difficulties for event studies. Standard procedures are typically well-specified even when special daily data characteristics are ignored. However, recognition of autocorrelation in daily excess returns and changes in their variance conditional on an event can sometimes be advantageous. In addition, tests ignoring cross-sectional dependence can be well-specified and have higher power than tests which account for potential dependence.

Measuring security price performance

Journal of Financial Economics 1980 8(3), 205-258
Event studies focus on the impact of particular types of firm-specific events on the prices of the affected firms' securities. In this paper, observed stock return data are employed to examine various methodologies which are used in event studies to measure security price performance. Abnormal performance is introduced into this data. We find that a simple methodology based on the market model performs well under a wide variety of conditions. In some situations, even simpler methods which do not explicitly adjust for marketwide factors or for risk perform no worse than the market model. We also show how misuse of any of the methodologies can result in false inferences about the presence of abnormal performance.