This paper focuses on how best to measure the corporate marginal tax rate, which is an important input into financial analysis of the cost of capital, financing policy, corporate hedging, and corporate reorganizations. The results indicate that the simulated tax rate used by Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996), although difficult to calculate, is the best available proxy for the ‘true’ marginal tax rate. If the simulated rate is unavailable, an easy-to-calculate trichotomous variable or the statutory marginal tax rate (which captures the progressivity in the tax schedule) are reasonable alternatives, better than most commonly used tax variables.

We gather a unique sample of 44 tax shelter cases to investigate the magnitude of tax shelter activity and whether participating in a shelter is related to corporate debt policy. The average annual deduction produced by the shelters in our sample is very large, equaling approximately nine percent of asset value. These deductions are more than three times as large as interest deductions for comparable companies. The firms in our sample use less debt when they engage in tax sheltering. Compared to companies with similar pre-shelter debt ratios, the debt ratios of firms engaged in tax shelters fall by about 8%. The tax shelter firms in our sample appear underlevered if shelters are ignored but do not appear underlevered once shelters are considered.

Do taxes affect corporate debt policy? This paper tests whether the incremental use of debt is positively related to simulated firm-specific marginal tax rates that account for net operating losses, investment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax. The simulated marginal tax rates exhibit substantial variation due to the dynamics of the tax code, tax regime shifts, business cycle effects, and the progressive nature of the statutory tax schedule. Using annual data from more than 10,000 firms for the years 1980–1992, I provide evidence which indicates that high-tax-rate firms issue more debt than their low-tax-rate counterparts.

We study the capital investment, stock issuance, and cash savings behavior of non-tech manufacturers (old economy firms) during the 1990s technology bubble. Our empirical results show that high stock prices affect corporate policies because they relax financing constraints. During the tech bubble, constrained non-tech firms' investment responded strongly to “high stock prices” (specifically, the component of price that is not captured by fundamentals). They also issued stock in response to that overvaluation effect, saving part of the proceeds in their cash accounts. We find no such patterns for unconstrained non-tech firms, nor for tech firms. Our findings are not consistent with the notion that managers systematically issue overvalued stocks and invest in ways that transfer wealth from new to old shareholders. More broadly, they suggest that what appears to be overvaluation in one sector of the economy may have positive externalities for other sectors.

We survey 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure. Large firms rely heavily on present value techniques and the capital asset pricing model, while small firms are relatively likely to use the payback criterion. A surprising number of firms use firm risk rather than project risk in evaluating new investments. Firms are concerned about financial flexibility and credit ratings when issuing debt, and earnings per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation when issuing equity. We find some support for the pecking-order and trade-off capital structure hypotheses but little evidence that executives are concerned about asset substitution, asymmetric information, transactions costs, free cash flows, or personal taxes.

We analyze the advice contained in a sample of 237 investment newsletter strategies over 1980-1992. Each newsletter strategy recommends a mix of equity and cash. We find no evidence that letters systematically increase equity weights before market rises or decrease weights before market declines. While there is no information in the newsletter strategies about future market returns, we document that disagreement among the newsletters is correlated with future realized and implied volatility.

We use a unique data set that contains information on more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be monolithic; instead, our results show that it varies across corporate policies and also varies with the personal characteristics of the CEO. We find that CEOs delegate financial decisions for which they need the most input, when they are overloaded, and when they are distracted by recent acquisitions. CEOs delegate less when they are knowledgeable (long-tenured or with a finance background). Capital is allocated based on “gut feel” and the personal reputation of the manager running a given division. Finally, corporate politics and corporate socialism affect capital allocation in European and Asian firms.

We administer psychometric tests to senior executives to obtain evidence on their underlying psychological traits and attitudes. We find US CEOs differ significantly from non-US CEOs in terms of their underlying attitudes. In addition, we find that CEOs are significantly more optimistic and risk-tolerant than the lay population. We provide evidence that CEOs' behavioral traits such as optimism and managerial risk-aversion are related to corporate financial policies. Further, we provide new empirical evidence that CEO traits such as risk-aversion and time preference are related to their compensation.

Unregulated US corporations dramatically increased their debt usage over the past century. Aggregate leverage—low and stable before 1945—more than tripled between 1945 and 1970 from 11% to 35%, eventually reaching 47% by the early 1990s. The median firm in 1946 had no debt, but by 1970 had a leverage ratio of 31%. This increase occurred in all unregulated industries and affected firms of all sizes. Changing firm characteristics are unable to account for this increase. Rather, changes in government borrowing, macroeconomic uncertainty, and financial sector development play a more prominent role. Despite this increase among unregulated firms, a combination of stable debt usage among regulated firms and a decrease in the fraction of aggregate assets held by regulated firms over this period resulted in a relatively stable economy-wide leverage ratio during the 20th century.

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller, for example, than the strong persistence in board structure that we show. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies show a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.