This paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the mechanisms linking financial shocks and real activity. In particular, we investigate the growth impact of banking crises on industries with different levels of dependence on external finance. If banks are the key institutions allowing credit constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden loss of these intermediaries in a system in which such intermediaries are important should have a disproportionately contractionary impact on the sectors that flourished due to their reliance on banks. Using data from 38 developed and developing countries that experienced financial crises during the last quarter century, we find that those sectors that are highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially greater contraction of value added during a banking crisis in countries with deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. Our results do not suggest, however, that on net the externally dependent firms fare worse in deep financial systems.

We analyze the behavior of over-the-counter currency option prices across moneyness, maturity, and calendar time on two of the most actively traded currency pairs over the past eight years. We find that, on any given date, the conditional risk-neutral distribution of currency returns can show strong asymmetry. This asymmetry varies greatly over time and often switches signs. We develop and estimate a class of models that captures this stochastic skew behavior. Model estimation shows that our stochastic skew models significantly outperform traditional jump-diffusion stochastic volatility models both in sample and out of sample.

Equity prices are driven by shocks with persistence levels ranging from intraday horizons to several decades. To accommodate this diversity, we introduce a parsimonious equilibrium model with regime shifts of heterogeneous durations in fundamentals, and estimate specifications with up to 256 states on daily aggregate returns. The multifrequency equilibrium has higher likelihood than the Campbell and Hentschel [1992. No news is good news: an asymmetric model of changing volatility in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 31, 281–318] specification, while producing volatility feedback 10 to 40 times larger. Furthermore, Bayesian learning about volatility generates a novel trade-off between skewness and kurtosis as information quality varies, complementing the uncertainty channel [e.g., Veronesi, 1999. Stock market overreaction to bad news in good times: a rational expectations equilibrium model. Review of Financial Studies 12, 975–1007]. Economies with intermediate information best match daily returns.

This paper examines the bank lending relations of a large sample of technology and nontechnology firms that went public during the 1996–2000 period. We use a unique hand-collected data set to examine the characteristics of firms that establish pre- Initial Public Offering (IPO) bank lending relations and whether post-IPO performance is related to the existence and size of pre-IPO banking relations. We find that the majority of IPO firms have banking relations before they go public. Firms with banking relations are older, more profitable or, in the case of tech firms, have lower losses, and are more likely to have funding from venture capitalists than firms without banking relations. We also find that banks lent aggressively to technology firms in the sense that current earnings and cash flows were significantly less important in determining banking relations for technology firms than for nontechnology firms. Consistent with the importance of so-called soft information in lending decisions, we find that, controlling for ex ante observable risk measures, there is a positive and significant relation between improvements in post-IPO operating performance and the existence and size of pre-IPO banking relations. Overall, our results indicate that firms with the best current and future prospects establish banking relations. Our findings provide an explanation as to why investors could interpret lending relations as a positive signal of firm quality.

This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the design of the corporate tax system affects the amount of private benefits extracted by company insiders and that the quality of the corporate governance system affects the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. Analyses of a tax enforcement crackdown in Russia and cross-country data on tax changes support this two-way interaction between corporate governance and corporate taxation.

We extend the standard specification of the market price of risk for affine yield models, and apply it to U.S. Treasury data. Our specification often provides better fit, sometimes with very high statistical significance. The improved fit comes from the time-series rather than cross-sectional features of the yield curve. We derive conditions under which our specification does not admit arbitrage opportunities. The extension has extremely strong statistical significance for affine yield models with multiple square-root type variables. Although we focus on affine yield models, our specification can be used with other asset pricing models as well.

Using a unique panel dataset that tracks corporate board development from a firm's IPO through 10 years later, we find that: (i) board size and independence increase as firms grow and diversify over time; (ii) board size—but not board independence—reflects a tradeoff between the firm-specific benefits and costs of monitoring; and (iii) board independence is negatively related to the manager's influence and positively related to constraints on that influence. These results indicate that economic considerations—in particular, the specific nature of the firm's competitive environment and managerial team—help explain cross-sectional variation in corporate board size and composition. Nonetheless, much of the variation in board structures remains unexplained, suggesting that idiosyncratic factors affect many individual boards’ characteristics.