Fama and French [2002. The equity premium. Journal of Finance 57, 637–659] estimate the equity premium using dividend growth rates to measure expected rates of capital gain. We apply their method to study the value premium. From 1945 to 2005, the expected value premium is on average 6.1% per annum, consisting of an expected dividend growth component of 4.4% and an expected dividend price ratio component of 1.7%. Unlike the equity premium, the value premium has been largely stable over the last half century.

The interaction between an investment bank's research and market making arms may have important implications for the trading of a firm's stock. We investigate the impact that research has on the liquidity provided by the bank's market maker. Utilizing a large sample of Nasdaq firms, we show that market makers whose banks also provide research coverage provide more liquidity and contribute more to price discovery than do market makers without such research coverage. Finally, we show that such “affiliated” market makers are less affected by uncertainty following earnings announcements. Our results provide new evidence on the sources of liquidity improvements for Nasdaq firms, and suggest that the information produced by banks in the sell-side research process is beneficial to their market makers.

We examine cash dividends and share repurchases from 1989 to 2005 in the 15 nations that were members of the European Union before May 2004. As in the United States, the fraction of European firms paying dividends declines, while total real dividends paid increase and share repurchases surge. We also show that financial reporting frequency is associated with higher payout, and that privatized companies account for almost one-quarter of total cash dividends and share repurchases. Our regression analyses indicate that increasing fractions of retained earnings to equity do not increase the likelihood of cash payouts, whereas company age does.

We argue that when managers have private information about the productivity of assets under their control and receive private benefits, substantial bonuses are required to induce less productive managers to declare that capital should be reallocated. The need to provide incentives for managers to relinquish control links executive compensation to capital reallocation and managerial turnover over the business cycle, rendering them procyclical if expected managerial compensation increases when more managers are hired. Moreover, capital is less productively deployed in downturns because agency costs make reallocation more costly. Empirically, we find that both CEO turnover and executive compensation are remarkably procyclical.

This paper reexamines the validity of the expectation hypothesis (EH) of the term structure of US repo rates ranging in maturity from overnight to 3 months. We extend the work of Longstaff [2000b. The term structure of very short term rates: new evidence for the expectations hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 397–415] in two directions: (1) we implement statistical tests designed to increase test power in this context; (2) more important, we assess the economic value of departures from the EH based on criteria of profitability and economic significance in the context of a simple trading strategy. The EH is rejected throughout the term structure examined on the basis of the statistical tests. However, the results of our economic analysis are favorable to the EH, suggesting that the statistical rejections of the EH in the repo market are economically insignificant.

We examine “just vote no” campaigns, a recent innovation in low-cost shareholder activist tools whereby activists encourage their fellow shareholders to withhold votes toward a director's election to express dissatisfaction with management performance or the firm's corporate governance structure. Grundfest [1993. Just vote no: a minimalist strategy for dealing with barbarians inside the gates. Stanford Law Review 45, 857–937] argues that a substantial withheld vote motivates directors to take immediate action to avoid further embarrassment. We find a variety of supportive evidence, including operating performance improvements and abnormal disciplinary chief executive officer (CEO) turnover, indicating that such campaigns induce boards to take actions in shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, abnormal turnover is robust to controlling for concurrent events and firm- and CEO-specific controls.

Recent empirical work suggests that a proxy for the probability of informed trading (PIN) is an important determinant of the cross-section of average returns. This paper examines whether PIN is priced because of information asymmetry or because of other liquidity effects that are unrelated to information asymmetry. Our starting point is a model that decomposes PIN into two components, one related to asymmetric information and one related to illiquidity. In a two-pass Fama-MacBeth [1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636] regression, we show that the PIN component related to asymmetric information is not priced, while the PIN component related to illiquidity is priced. We conclude, therefore, that liquidity effects unrelated to information asymmetry explain the relation between PIN and the cross-section of expected returns.

This paper examines the determinants and consequences of investor activism in venture capital. Using a hand-collected sample of European venture capital deals, it shows the importance of human capital. Venture capital firms with partners that have prior business experience are more active recruiting managers and directors, helping with fundraising, and interacting more frequently with their portfolio companies. Independent venture capital firms are also more active than ‘captive’ (bank-, corporate-, or government-owned) firms. After controlling for endogeneity, investor activism is shown to be positively related to the success of portfolio companies.

This paper reexamines the relation between firm value and board structure. We find that complex firms, which have greater advising requirements than simple firms, have larger boards with more outside directors. The relation between Tobin's Q and board size is U-shaped, which, at face value, suggests that either very small or very large boards are optimal. This relation, however, arises from differences between complex and simple firms. Tobin's Q increases (decreases) in board size for complex (simple) firms, and this relation is driven by the number of outside directors. We find some evidence that R&D-intensive firms, for which the firm-specific knowledge of insiders is relatively important, have a higher fraction of insiders on the board and that, for these firms, Q increases with the fraction of insiders on the board. Our findings challenge the notion that restrictions on board size and management representation on the board necessarily enhance firm value.

In this paper we investigate the effect of local banking development on firms’ innovative activities, using a rich data set on innovation for a large number of Italian firms over the 1990s. There is evidence that banking development affects the probability of process innovation, particularly for firms in high-tech sectors, in sectors more dependent upon external finance, and for firms that are small. The evidence for product innovation is much weaker and not robust. There is also some evidence that banking development reduces the cash flow sensitivity of fixed investment spending, particularly for small firms, and that it increases the probability they will engage in R&D.