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Reputation and investor activism: A structural approach

Journal of Financial Economics 2021 139(1), 29-56 open access
We measure the impact of reputation for proxy fighting on investor activism by estimating a dynamic model in which activists engage a sequence of target firms. Our estimation produces an evolving reputation measure for each activist and quantifies its impact on campaign frequency and outcomes. We find that high reputation activists initiate 3.5 times as many campaigns and extract 85% more settlements from targets, and that reputation-building incentives explain 20% of campaign initiations and 19% of proxy fights. Our estimates indicate these reputation effects combine to nearly double the value that activism adds for target shareholders.

Benchmark interest rates when the government is risky

Journal of Financial Economics 2021 140(1), 74-100
Since the global financial crisis, interest rate swap rates, which represent future uncollateralized interbank borrowing, have fallen below maturity-matched Treasury rates. This is surprising, because US Treasuries, which are deemed expensive because of superior liquidity and safety, should produce yields that are lower than those of swap rates. We show, by no-arbitrage, that sovereign default risk explains negative swap spreads even without frictions such as balance sheet constraints, convenience yield, and hedging demand. We support this explanation with an equilibrium model that jointly accounts for macroeconomic fundamentals and the term structures of interest and US credit default swap rates.

Rejected stock exchange applicants

Journal of Financial Economics 2021 139(2), 502-521
We examine listing applications by firms to the London Stock Exchange between 1891 and 1911. The exchange rejected 82 (13.1%) of the 628 applicants to its main board. Accepted applicants were twice as likely to pay dividends (and to pay twice as much) and had longer firm lives than rejected applicants. Rejected applicants were more likely to file for liquidation than successful applicants. These results remain even after we control for the primary benefits of the listing itself: liquidity and future capital inflows. In this era, the London Stock Exchange could screen applicants for listing.