Little is known about the price firms pay for stock repurchases. Using a data set of all U.S. repurchases from 2004 to 2011, we compare the actual average price paid monthly in a repurchase with the average market price for the same stock over various horizons. We find that firms repurchase stock at a significantly lower price than the average market price in all sample years. Less frequent repurchasers, firms that repurchase when insiders buy on their own account, and firms that experience low stock returns prior to the repurchase obtain significantly lower prices. After controlling for risk factors, repurchasing firms earn positive returns. Infrequent repurchasers earn a significantly higher return up to three years following the actual repurchase.

While the percentage of mature firms with classified boards or dual class shares has declined by more than 40% since 1990, the percentage of IPO firms with these structures has doubled over this period. We test whether IPO firms implement these structures optimally or whether they are utilized to allow managers to protect their private benefits of control. Both shareholder voting patterns and changes in firm types going public suggest that the Agency Hypothesis best explains IPO firm's use of dual class, particularly when there is a large voting-cash flow wedge. In contrast, among firms with high information asymmetry, classified board structures are better explained by the Optimal Governance hypothesis.

Prior research finds that firms hire directors for their acquisition experience, regardless of acquisition quality (whether their prior acquisitions earned positive or negative announcement returns). Using several short- and long-run measures, we examine the effects of directors’ acquisition experience on the acquisition performance of firms hiring them. We find that board acquisition experience is positively related to subsequent acquisition performance, demonstrating that firms appropriately value experience. Beyond experience itself, however, the quality of directors’ prior acquisitions is also important. Our results suggest that firms may be better served to select directors based upon both past acquisition experience and acquisition performance.

Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms. Benefits are lowest among Forbes 500 firms, which likely require more monitoring than advising.

In April 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) was enacted to help revitalize the initial public offering (IPO) market, especially for small firms. During the year ending March 2014, IPO volume and the proportion of small firm issuers was the largest since 2000. Controlling for market conditions, we estimate that the JOBS Act has led to 21 additional IPOs annually, a 25% increase over pre-JOBS levels. Firms with high proprietary disclosure costs, such as biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, increase IPO activity the most. These firms are also more likely to take advantage of the act׳s de-risking provisions, allowing firms to file the IPO confidentially while testing-the-waters.

We explore the labor market effects of gender and race by examining board leadership appointments. Prior studies are often limited by observing only hired candidates, whereas the boardroom provides a controlled setting where both hired and unhired candidates are observable. Although diverse (female and minority) board representation has increased, diverse directors are significantly less likely to serve in leadership positions despite possessing stronger qualifications than nondiverse directors. While specialized skills such as prior leadership or finance experience increase the likelihood of appointment, that likelihood is reduced for diverse directors. Additional tests provide no evidence that diverse directors are less effective.

Using a unique panel dataset that tracks corporate board development from a firm's IPO through 10 years later, we find that: (i) board size and independence increase as firms grow and diversify over time; (ii) board size—but not board independence—reflects a tradeoff between the firm-specific benefits and costs of monitoring; and (iii) board independence is negatively related to the manager's influence and positively related to constraints on that influence. These results indicate that economic considerations—in particular, the specific nature of the firm's competitive environment and managerial team—help explain cross-sectional variation in corporate board size and composition. Nonetheless, much of the variation in board structures remains unexplained, suggesting that idiosyncratic factors affect many individual boards’ characteristics.