We extend the neoclassical investment model (Hayashi, 1982) to allow for limited commitment on compensation contracts. We consider three types of limited commitment: (i) managers cannot commit to compensation contracts that provide lower continuation utility than their outside options; (ii) shareholders cannot commit to negative net present value (NPV) projects; (iii) both the managers and the shareholders cannot commit. We characterize the optimal contract under general convex adjustment cost functions and provide examples for which closed-form solutions can be obtained. We show that, as in the data, small firms invest more, grow faster, and have a higher Tobin׳s Q than large firms under the optimal contract. In addition, the pattern of the dependence of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation on past performance implied by our model is also consistent with empirical evidence.

We compare the payout policies of US industrials and banks over the past 30 years to better understand dividends, especially for banks. For industrials, dividends grow strongly after 2002, when the declining propensity to pay reverses. Banks have a higher and more stable propensity to pay dividends and resist cutting dividends as the 2007–2008 financial crisis begins. Before the crisis, increases in repurchases push payouts to historic levels. These findings are broadly consistent with the idea that banks use dividends to signal financial strength while agency costs of free cash flow better explain industrial payouts.